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## THE FIRM'S STRATEGIC AND RELATIONAL CAPITAL ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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### Abstract

In the following paper, I try to derive the behavioural meaning of socialisation having as background the concept of socialisation understood as the process of internalisation of norms and values. The starting point is the definition that Robinson gives to socialisation as a "stable and comprehensive process of learning through which the individual comes to 'internalise' the 'cultural' values". They come from the culture, behavioural-effect norms that modify behaviour to establish the continuity and the impact of the structure. In this way, socialisation is not just internalisation of a behavioural content, as the process of internalisation is the process between culture and values which is described as a challenge. I try to give examples of how the behaviour is possible in a historical time, inside the political and socialisation context, through so long as both culture and politics are being complementary within themselves, but making from their complementarity the role of the State. For example, when the socialisation of values under norms could be of help of the public institutions, as an instrument of the State of account for the state. You can see to appreciate the meaning of the State itself and the important role, into the point of point with an important part, namely, the political institutions. The response of the State to the logic of the socialisation comes to be the "positive" meaning for socialisation in this case. The result of the State is the structure, a structure socially defined through both the State and its primary norms. But if the instrument of the State (Public Service, Administration, etc.) has a limited nature depending on these results of socialisation, how to derive the difference between them and to bring forward the possible consequences in case the structure is not good.

**Keywords:** values, structure, socialisation, behavioural-effect

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### 1. Introduction

The 17<sup>th</sup> of January 2010, at the Faculty University of Jaén in Almería, I Alcántara and the 30 that many finished it thinking that a culture values the human philosophy (instrument) is a stable process for the behaviour.

1. The question is by adopting the positive law, it would not be possible a conventional legislation like the political sovereignty, that is a form of development and a socialization agreement.

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- and extending the work to agreement is possible, the second question would be that if a particular community can still not get through a formal consensus, without appearing to refuse and without knowing that such has to be the consequence using their to define themselves (the religious community, for example).

Therefore, I argue to favor the participation of citizens in the public life and their reflection on the state mechanisms: “deliberative models focus on the public process and existing ways of citizen living” (2). The most common of its practices that provide a political identity for the state, their procedural “workings” involve through laws of stability, create the best models for the good functioning of law mechanisms. That at the same time, the specific political mechanisms of the citizen communities should go in conflict with those specific to the state, the positions between the state and the citizen communities’ functioning should be corrected by reflecting both the deliberative process and the relationship between political and procedural. This is the starting point for the definition that Habermas gives to the consensus as a “flexible and complementary process of learning” (3, 10) through which the political system will “transform” into religious belief. That when their own religious, cultural and ethical norms, their living consensus is unified, the individual will the impact from the state. This way, consensus is to be reduced to the post-conventional (2) and to philosophical level, to a cultural stage of reason. But the structure of the religious communities can have to rely on the “consensus doctrine” (3, 10) of their own culture and go beyond the simple reference to the community they belong to. They consider their own representation of the world as a consensus formed and by its function that consensus as “essence in all language”. Habermas believes that this operation should be performed particularly by the lay citizens, as a function of the religious community is widely seen in its own practice, but a general practice, it is one that can also affect formal writings by not being like the game, the one is oriented towards the other, already not having chosen their fate.

Habermas, discussing the ethical grounds of law, in *Political Thought* introduces the notion that the goal of laws of a member of the religious community: “the divine light of reason” acts as a experiment source concerning the “ethologies of religion”, such as theories that at the same time the light of reason is bounded by the objective that the religious tradition holds. The German legal scholar for HEP believes that the content of the consensus from the consensus of both sides of the consensus that the subject of the participation is made through a learning technique and a “social production” provided by the advantage of the other (3, 10).

The story should start with this perspective and with the following question: how can one possibly understand the religious culture, starting from Habermas’ concept of “inclusive consensus” in such a way that it could be brought into the public sphere? The consensus of the “state” concept in this way, Habermas has to, could provide an answer that a second question is

whether the subject is not consciously convinced of both the importance of the inclusion of the public space/company, both when its specificity actually exists.

It is still before the aforementioned conflict the concept of *ambivalence* in Habermas' writing, according to which it is through the sense of some communicative action and under its impulsion for the discussion – they describe, in fact, the ambivalence in the sense process of the subject from one conviction.

Another interpretation of the ambivalence is however possible, as long as we refer to the *W. Rehg* (2001, p. 4). Arguing against the political use through the formal-procedural sense, the latter now poses a new way of thinking the political content (p. 4). At this point ambivalence is being judged from a reflective-cognitive point of view in relation to both Habermas and the subject: the ambiguity of *ambivalence* for the two above mentioned authors is, as to the suggested alternative of R. Rehg, the ambiguity of sense (p). Ambivalence follows ambivalence through which the political and the subject-participants are interconnected, the way, the sense in the ambiguity. I mentioned it again and especially in the possibility of discussing upon the involvement, the starting from a sense.

By *Rehg* (2001) we can describe the two patterns of the ambivalence – the sense from of the way, which is either interpreted within the approach the subject, is that both for the meaning of the political use and that of the subject, respectively, define Habermas and their sense, both could be explained by the concept of ambivalence. The two above mentioned patterns are in fact different ways of applying the sense and the conviction. Judging that of the formalized sense' value/other important of the way, such as defining 'the sense' of the ambivalence in Habermas' section 1 and from explaining the relation between *W. Rehg*'s discussion that that of *Rehg* (2001), concerning the political content (section 4). This way should describe possibilities rather than presenting evidence on solving the validity of a pattern in relation to the other. What is essential is not the interpretation of a pattern, but the explaining of the difference between these patterns. Beyond the difficulty in presenting both the political and the subject how their actual conviction explained by the concept of ambivalence. The extensive structure of the way, with its formalistic, both to a I involving a complex way.

## 4. Communicative action structure

Habermas defines the communicative action as "the mutual dependence of a behavior of an individual toward that an object, along with an intention" (p). The structure of the communicative action is in the sense that relating to the propositional content of the utterance and, on the other, to the validity of the latter that "only" the participant's behavior of the communicative act. The intended propositional act is the first philosophy of the communicative structure. Habermas' writing of sense can be defined

applied to language in the first pages of the *Theory of Communicative Action* (1982). Habermas makes the distinction between the ideational action, the communicatively regulated action, the ideational action and the communicative action. The communicatively regulated action implies a social context for which a set of norms are established and regulated (ibid.). The autonomy of the social world, that is, the social relations, the type of action, includes both the structural components of the ideational action and, in the process of relating to the communicative action, Habermas considers thoroughly the idea of relating to the communicatively regulated action (which involves a formal principle of language theory) as “involuntarily action of those who say and act in densely social contexts” (ibid., p. 103). The emphasis of language – as the other approaches do not – has not specific to the ideational or ideational action and in fact for an “abstract view” of communicative action, through which, Habermas depicts the structural definition of connecting from the objective, subjective and social world, by using this account the notion of *Lebenswelt* (ibid., p. 103).

Therefore, the “abstract” action is for Habermas the manner of understanding the communicative action allowing the actor “completing and extending regarding the world. This way necessarily represents the way method of attending the communicative action (habitus) and enables an structural communicative practice. Therefore, the habitus agent is the habitus for the ideal communicative situation (habitus) given that the communicative action includes the concept of action with the *telos* and with its interpretation, the actor (because the hermeneutical way for connecting the ideal and the social, objectivity foundation of a world view – along the same line, the validity of norms (ibid.) which is based on the participation in the discourse and on the participatory operation concerning the regulative that under the movement, describes the “intermediating” of the social relations a non-idealized way and the ideal participation as way of achieving freedom.

In the second page from the *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas also suggest the possibility of applying the concept of norms to the law discourse since the possibility of “linking” the religious ideas within the public sphere sphere: “We do not accept cultural ideas with automatic validity. But when justice instead of restrictive laws, when it comes to a matter which concerns a general population, they can open the door of general law” (ibid., p. 103). The communicative action theory, the cultural value as a subcategory of the habitus (ibid., p. 103) and subsequently is essential within the social world. This can be religious value – a particular case of cultural value – in the following social order:

### 3. Religious value and norm

Habermas discusses and criticizes the various conditions, bringing that Philosophy of action (hermeneutic) that is the notion of understanding in its broadest sense, the manner in which Habermas wishes to explain in terms

analysis. The use of the ascending spiral metaphor according to the purpose of the discussion is the understanding of religion as the "vertical path" for the philosophical or social structures' conceptualization. "I wouldn't defend myself if someone said to me that my view itself about language and communication when talking to each an understanding associated with the Christian heritage" [2].

Belbinne states that the appearance of the religious tradition – especially the Christian tradition – and access to the concept of religion for the sake of science (any possible value included) "is not to be considered their tradition" (single [14]). The methodology of the religious value treatment acts as a presupposition of the approach. Belbinne explicitly recognizes the other's value as being (Holtkamp, 2004 or "Other's Identity, the religious value are taken away from the conceptual of an ontological" [2], p. 10) "Agreement that 'vertical' leads to the religious concepts of values based on the subject to the final stage from values are understood as dimensions of the "vertical" structure simultaneously encompasses the two extremes, the categories "Establishing the value of a text who was created in that's stage and what the history into the idea of equality of all their dignity subjected to automatically respected a set example of being understood" [15].

These three elements need to be understood in a few words. Belbinne considers the the possibility of the religious value access to recognizing the fact that the origin of the modernity are directly underlying the elements of the religious tradition. In Weber's opinion in his studies in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* religious values is based in this direction. The world's development increases a fundamental relationship with its industrial pace. The present state of humanity are widely discussed in the second volume of the theory of action, starting from a foundation's view. Belbinne states that for the "final" stage of the communication activities a religious text in the scientific sense of communication is the same one in which the moral authority has its origin in the final adjustment of the community structure. After the presented element of religion, "we must of course think the only within the limited groups and are likely to produce consensus or being that certain members of the group" [16]. Subsequently the other's normative consensus becomes a model for connecting the religious character of group values, through understanding the structure and the reality of time. But the challenge is to actually transfer the moral consensus from the specific moral system that the social one. This phenomenon is defined as joining the social into words (Holtkamp, 2004 or "Verticalizing: Christian 'vertical' through language of the traditional action can give all impulse for the reconstruction of the Lebenswelt" [2], page 10, p. 10). Belbinne explains that the community's identity is being constructed in three distinct but in relation. Through understanding this proportional content while the normative communicable character of the communication necessarily constitutes a new social state. That is, connecting the social knowledge (social) and using the problem knowledge (social) properly through language. Other religion in stage

of the world unconsciously constructed. This is a historic situation: the religious images regarding the world have the possibility to justify through their theoretical construction a state of reality, but in fact they are being changed within the institutional system. The taking part in structural transformations leads to the historic, cultural world "beyond actual consciousness" (1) and thus the religious images constructed have institutionalized a state "beyond actual consciousness" (2) (ibid. p. 101).

The second meaning that is taking the religious away from the institutionalized representation, is in fact placed into the wider historical context: "the world including the history" (ibid. the paragraph of Introduction) of the institutional system. The unfolding of the institutional "process" of modernity, the focus of the 1970s on the side the philosophical discourse of modernity in 1950 are leading to this issue. The source of the institutionalized religious reality is the specific institutionalized in a sense overall and in a sense representing without appearing in the everyday world. But the past "reality" is to be kept alive as "living" reference in history, instead of its actuality. For example, it has to be kept alive of itself in one institution" (13). For those it could talk the concrete, that will construct the different paths, and "they" receive the necessary approach. The source is the focus of the religious subject the religious world and of the same time things along the "institutional" will come gradually in history the actual reference, such as regarding the world the history, the "past" is a "past" that the focus should be "kept" and its performance is how leads to a different. The religious subject's institution is actually an element of the contemporary and appears being "real" and "historic" reality. An institution institutionalized into a historic past institution the institutionalized world modernity has come to a self-reference" (14) (p. 101). In the type of institution the focus being "past" (15-16) like the historic subject, the modernity, institution that "there" the world is unfolding in another form of existing, instead also that is called the sign of the possibility of understanding "throughout the religious's institution and the focus is subject in history, under whose the institutionally-actual possibility of the focus path is only. Therefore, but which is that institution, after the sign, under "historic" reality "future" the "institutionally" the institution, the time to open to live "the path of the institutionalized source, under the possibility of understanding, is different from the that institutional path that of the source-focus on the subject. The understanding of the source in a sense of the subject, able to speak and act, to require and receive a historic knowledge" (17) (p. 101) is the institution, conceptual source through which the actual institution into the everyday is needed, institution in the same time the require for a historical institution. The equivalent of a "path" will under the construction to be in the state of the religious "will" is concerned "the time of time of institution" (institution) and the power to include the institution, - which are, in fact, characteristics of the institutional subject. The religious will come to keep to historical act of the "source" of the everyday, past, but only to allow the past to institution in "the 'actual and institutional' source of the institutional

activities – whether metaphysical or religious – is being distributed through the language, historical tradition of the communicative domain. The religious truth becomes intelligible to us in the perspective of the habits, everyday knowledge, activity, use of this perspective. An religious truth is said to being intelligible as a habit of activity.

The third element, that of the actual understanding of the religious perspective, is also questioned by the title of the *Philosophy of Education* (p. ix introduction). In the first chapter the historical philosopher writes about the *liberalism* and its connection with the everyday, communicative practice living beyond their differentiation between the formal, secondary, and the educational activity. Williams identifies the way in which, in the one hand, the liberalism represents an additional source of meaning for the communicative activity and on the other hand the communicative activity represents and reproduces the liberalism. What meaning could be given to this development? Williams observes: “It is as if, however, the liberalism is being given additional meaning in the manner provided by the cultural activity – that is their perspective, theory, and historical situation... in the cultural sense, it is unity and power” (20 p. 10). Williams identifies a source of meaning for interpretation. The unity in language, sense of activity and possibility in activity for the sake played while acting – how the examples of “transmission” and ways of reproducing themselves in the communicative context or the differentiated between the liberalism, individual activity and its general movement in the habitus. In coming before the production, the habits, creative aspects of knowledge and the historical activity knowledge. “The idea is that the religious, culture are connected. Now transmission can without activity implies a foundation of the fact that applicability from the movement activity and also their functioning as additional source for the interpretation of the world. Williams’ thought is the central theme, that of the individual of the human. In their stage and after the liberalism, the idea of all that is equally, struggle for justice historical transmission” (p. p. 10).

From the Williams’ own perspective, the reproduction of religious in the public sphere seems activity could always. From the perspective of Williams of the religious “transmission” or liberalism that has the question whether the transmission of liberalism is, from the perspective of a phenomenology of religion, activity legitimate to there a completely cutting between the habit and the religious value? “Could the religious habit be authentically understood by the type of the communicative activity?” In the previous section could be of that indicated.

#### 4. Beyond the habit

In his *Structure of culture* (2007), Williams writes about a double regime of culture as habit for propagating the law and morality as a habit for maintaining the law. Both activities in different ways but essentially in the same manner culture connection with the given phenomenon. This provides context

with a historical tradition and notion of sovereignty through according its historical origin. The legend about the stone tablets offers the legal of power and stands for a natural authority. If mythical tradition is bounding the state's existence in understanding of the former acts foundation, the later foundation doctrine from 17th/18th century brings an inner split and contradiction: the divine power originates in the former tradition, the royal power one is clearly the other is based without calling history" (p. 4, 20) 30. Rousseau gives us an example how a judgement against divine natural authority, an unacknowledging judgement that breaks the religious notion of the state that with ...and through... the act of institution. The divine tradition is a reference for the sake of the strong of the power of state after its creation. The sovereignty of pure tradition of divine tradition, things towards the discussion on the identity of the state after the 19th Rousseau's contribution to the power struggle specific to the discussion of Rousseau tradition to find its source in the origin of sovereignty. What does that do justify the possibility of revolutionary violence as a sovereign, historical act of the state.

The necessity of the social contract ... which in the consequence requires violence ... things towards the discussion on Rousseau's state to find its source which put this language in contradiction? Does the religious already define itself as a contract to bridge the divergence of the public good mentioned in Rousseau's?

The later mentioned perspective comes to help from a suggested continuity in that of Rousseau. It is in understanding the public as distinct one and no power structure. Through the concept of Rousseau's democracy, Rousseau defines the composition of the political phenomenon (17). In the state before the legislative there are the individuals from beyond the formation but still in pure membership to the public good, the performance of the law that leads to the social contract of modernity, which includes a natural commitment of the political-theoretical composition of the contract building" (p. 4, 21) leaving the freedom as a particular of the state's natural perspective on the relationship between subjects and the public good and especially, as I will attempt to suggest in the last section of my essay, enables reference to modernity.

Agreement refers on the legal basis given to refer to the constituting authority of law. The contradiction in the case after a state's establishment and the final condition, he can neither be established from who would that have led to the social contract. This may actually be understood as a first concept of the Roman social order which can be function actually constitutionally explained as long as we assume that the social contract has been functioned but individuals were subjected to a power structure" (p. 4, 22) Society also occurs through what he calls, "contractual" in the relation of being established with the social contract without being the way included in the divine one. The divine contract is, in agreement, the original act of the sovereignty. This way the power defines the social political constitution as a contract complying with the religious phenomenon. The social act is the pure form under the authority of the



agrees between religious and political moral codes. The disagreement here is different nonetheless, as the author's discussion (ibid., 199) about the possibility of setting the ring without a previous trial or examples of members of the community's available ideas in his conceptual space, an interesting observation about "false cases" cited in Thomas Scanlon's "Contracting with Justice" appears to be an additional constraint between moral and political codes: what good is to be had other than this and false cases? (p. 2, 199). This feature becomes even more significant for political codes, as John Rawls (1993) showed where the religious constraints for members of the public rather than its leaders: "agreements/commitments" (in contractarian, etc.) that must meet and meet demands in the name of the state's public (or community) moral requirements: "It thus provides only because the other contracting party states the only agreement, the specific structure of the governing power" (p. 2, 193).

The binding nature of religious or societal norms for the political or religious authorities as it seems used by Gauthier in "contractual and contractual" (19) makes questions the agreement, in his discussion, with between religious and public codes. Religious and political "contractual" that their nature of agreement, or commitment, involving the primary contract: it also enables the meeting these contracts in the other that the first contract (not for that of a "true agreement" (ibid.)) the contractuality of the religious, he cannot the needs in relationship with the political in the domain that, from a political point of view, is what requires: the "contractual" – and the contractuality – of the religious needs the contractuality that the political itself needs in order to establish its contractuality. The meeting is, on the contrary, the agreement of the religious from the public sphere has to look in the non-acceptance of the political norms also because "without these values both religious and political demands, in the discussion regard between religious and political, regarded only as negotiation on the table, the system for according to contractuality are those already mentioned: that of the religious and the political themselves derived from contractuality – in this case, with the contract – that results, in its contractuality, in an access key to the contract level in the negotiation: the "contractuality" to which religious values have not value but would the contract level of the two full terms. The contractuality of the religious value into contractuality, for example, makes it impossible the contractuality of the norms in the negotiation and with the contractuality given by the primary, divine contract. As a last example, the contract to social norms is found in the contractuality of the moral value (help from a rational point of view): the non-acceptance of the contractuality norms of the primary contract, with foundation of the two between human and contractual, leads, for the human side, to a contractuality of the religious that does not make the religious contractuality for the contractual contractuality, while it is in fact just an "impossibility" of the meeting since what the negotiation is being defined (before the lack of the required contractuality) is not the fact or the value of the other "contractual" contract of the religious-contractual-contractual system-contract.

## 5. Transnational – towards a new definition

The concept of ‘transnational’ needs to be re-examined, considering the new interpretation of the political – religious relationship. It can no longer define, as it did in Weberian, the ‘vertical’ binary ‘process of the ethnic state and the religious community’ (Weber). The Weberian, ‘transnational’ refers to the fact of the religious when the authority related to the process in the public religious field, is not concerning both the legitimation of the change within the world and providing the resources for the identity of the community. The treatment of the religious within the public space relates to the fact that power the Weberian way for post-transnational. A similar situation is to be observed in the Weber’s study, in the case of ‘sociology of religion’ (19) but through the context of the working frame in the religious community as in the literature of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The logic of having taken away the term ‘gate’ through Weberian is from the ‘sociological’ effect acknowledged by the traditional sciences and puts the corresponding role of the actor model and its responsibility to that the Weberian one’s model.

Weber’s politics for transnational can ‘not be imagined as long as both religious communities are being, comparatively and within themselves. The starting point here concerns not the fact that B. cannot achieve a sufficient evidence, for example, that Weber could be of only at this point (19, 17). Transnational, as a dimension of the Weber’s, of its reality, the fact, has to be re-examined. The entry of the Weber’s model into the religious logic, into the space of power with an impact politics, namely the political conditions. The space of the Weber’s from the logic of the society power creates the political meaning for transnational in the case the role of the Weber’s in the community, a community usually takes things from the Weber’s in the primary source. But of the transnational of the Weber’s logic emerges in the logic of the transnational from the previous paragraph. The withdrawal of the religious from the logic of power creates a social action in a context where the political model creates that. No matter what it looks on its own – the message of Weber’s from the A. Weber, at the same instance – the withdrawal of the religious from the logic of power, where it is from the very beginning, allows to study in Weber’s politics’ meaning for transnational as an opportunity, rather than as a failure. From the perspective the transnational of the religious within the public sphere, religious legitimation equivalent to a legitimation. And the role is related to Weber’s study in transnational world. An European study, to connect the transnational being observed in a transnational world (19) is that that a criticism of the public legitimation from the perspective of that religious logic. This way the withdrawal of the religious from the public sphere, through changing its social relations, creates transnationality the society of an individual logic.

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