
IDENTIFYING COMPLEX CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION IN LATE MODERNITY A FUZZY SET ANALYSIS OF 30 COUNTRIES

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Abstract

This study explores whether certain cultural configurations affect societies' levels of globalization. Existing data from cross-cultural surveys are employed with an aim to empirically describe the late-modern phenomena of individualization, reflexivity and uncertainty acceptance in order to explore whether the presence of these features in a society conditions the level of its globalization. Using fuzzy set analysis, we have discovered that none of these cultural features is a necessary condition for a globalized society. However, the presence of individualism in a society is a sufficient condition for its globalization, meaning that the presence of individualization guarantees its globalization. An alternative route to a more globalized collectivist society can be found only in the European territory in rare cases of reflexive societies avoiding uncertainty.

Keywords: globalization, late modernity, individualization, reflexivity, uncertainty avoidance

1. Introduction

The theory of Late Modernity [1, 2] is a part of a long sociological tradition of modernization theory, in which modernization is seen as a progressive, irreversible [3], homogenizing [4] and universal process [5], producing convergence among societies. Unlike theorists who argue that the world has entered a radically new postmodern period [6], Giddens [1, p. 176] suggests that we are still in modernity but have entered its late phase, in which the features of modernity have become intensified. The increased pace and scope of change, functional differentiation, and modern institutions such as capitalism, industrialism, and coordinated administrative power focused through surveillance and military power are seen as features of modernity processes, which have become universal in the processes of globalization.

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According to Giddens [1, p. 53], the defining characteristics of late modernity are rapid social change, disembedding, and reflexivity. Disembedding describes social practices that are no longer derived mainly from local contexts of a restricted time and place, but are typically being extended over large tracts of time and space. Technological and other advances made it possible to interact with limited time-space constraints making the boundaries between local and global or past and future transient. Local experiences and events are shaped by processes taking place on the other side of the world, and vice versa. In late modernity, local traditions are losing their power and ability to be a driving force of individuals' agency. As a result, people have greater ability to be reflexive about their social circumstances and make choices concerning their identities or agency that exceed the constraints of locally embedded reference frameworks [7]. The individual becomes a focal point of agency and responsibility and gains an increasing power vis-à-vis social structures. Beck terms these processes "reflexive modernization" [8].

However, reflexivity not only concerns traditional (pre-modern) frames of reference, but also modern achievements and institutions. Capitalism, processes of industrialization, urbanization, globalization, and others also become a theme of reflection and are partially presented as issues and risks, so the question of how social entities or individuals deal with the ambiguity and uncertainty they cause becomes relevant. As people become aware of systemic causes of risk, they submit the system to a systematic critique and call for fundamental changes to the system. The classic dialectic of actions and structure reverses, and the structures themselves become objects of reflexive debate and change. Reflexive modernization is linked to reflexive individualization [9].

The individualization thesis [2, p. 74; 10, 11] presupposes the trend of individuals being increasingly set free from cultural (traditional and modern reference frameworks of thought and judgment) or social constraints (such as class, nation, family) as the "emancipative values" [12] spread. These processes are seen as being universalistic [13]. The modernization theory has been criticized for being Eurocentric, although there is also an increasing body of evidence pointing to a conclusion that the trend of individualization is also taking root in non-Western societies [14, 15].

Universalism (an abstract, timeless, socially constructed principle) [16] should be distinguished from globalization (social, economic and political processes). The process of globalization has been thematized within various theoretical frameworks, including Wallerstein's World-System Theory, Castells Network Society, Theories of Global Culture [17-19], and Dependency Theory [20] among others. Our focus here is on the theory of modernity, in which the universalization of modernity is central to the very concept of globalization. Giddens [1, p. 63] views globalization as the outcome of the completion of modernization on the basis of the nation-state as the universal political form organized along the four axes of capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and military power [5, p. 59]. Mayer et al. [21] see globalization as the spread and

ultimate universalization of sets of modern values, practices and institutions through ‘isomorphic’ processes that operate on a global scale.

If we assume that globalization is a ‘product’ of modernization processes and is under the umbrella of the late-modernity theoretical framework associated with processes of disembedding, reflexivity, and rapid social change being linked with risk and ambivalence on one hand but also emancipated individuals on the other, it makes sense to investigate whether and how the processes of individualization, reflexivity, and dealing with uncertainties caused by risk awareness and rapid change relate to globalization. There is little dispute about the universality of nation-state, capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and military power (even though their manifestations can vary in different cultural settings). However, with regard to late-modern features, such as reflexivity, individualization or uncertainty, they are often described as trends. They can be understood as on-going (possibly universal) processes that have not reached the point of being universal (probably yet) in a way the above mentioned modern features have. Numerous cross-cultural comparative surveys and analysis [21-23] show that the presence of late-modern features discussed here, as well as related values, norms and behaviour in different cultures vary widely.

The aim of this article is to employ the existing data from cross-cultural studies with an aim to empirically describe sociological concepts of individualization, reflexivity, and uncertainty acceptance to explore whether the presence of these features in a society conditions the level of its globalization. We investigate whether societies characterized by individualism, reflexivity, or openness to uncertainty caused by risk awareness, ambiguity or rapid social change are more globalized in comparison to more collectivistic, monolithic or uncertainty-avoiding societies. Using fuzzy set analysis, we aim to establish if the outlined features of late modernity condition the level of societies’ globalization.

2. The selection of indicators

Our analysis is based on national-level data from various cross-cultural studies and may be, like the modernization theory itself, criticized for equating the concept of society with specific national societies. Our focus will not be specifically directed at various transnational entities and networks that do play a significant role in processes of globalization. If we want to estimate whether the level of individualization, reflexivity or openness to uncertainty can act either as a catalyst or hindering elements in the functioning of a society in dynamic global realities, we must first determine the indicators that will allow us to operationalize our assumptions. This proved to be a challenging task for various reasons. First, the data used for the analysis is collected from various sources [24-29], which raises the issue of validity in the context of the present study. Second, the data from cross-national studies (World Values Survey or European Values Survey, which are used, for instance, in Inglehards and Bakers’ and Minkov’s work and partially in the constructed KOF Indeks of globalization,

Hofstede's surveys, GLOBE Study) have been in past decades criticized for their questionable reliability, leading to possible doubts about the generalization of findings and theoretical conclusions [30-32]. The third challenge derives from the availability of data. As the data was derived from several different cross-national surveys, surveying different sets of countries, we ended up with a small sample of 30 countries with which to work. As we had a small-N situation, we opted for a qualitative comparative analysis that allows for the formal analysis of small-N situations using Boolean algebra. As the primary theoretical objective of comparative analysis is concept formation, elaboration and refinement of theory, our analysis should primarily be seen as an attempt to further reconsider knowledge about globalization in the framework of theories of late modernity, while also being aware of the shortcomings of the cross-national approach.

This study includes the KOF index of globalization that has been annually calculated by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute since 1970 [33]. Globalization is associated with processes of creating networks of connections among actors at multicontinental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods. It is seen as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. In KOF index of globalisation following dimensions of globalization are highlighted:

- economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges (indices and variables include: a) data on actual flows: trade (percent of GDP), foreign direct investments, stocks (percent of GDP), portfolio investment (percent of GDP), income payments for foreign nationals (percent of GDP); b) data on restrictions: hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue), capital account restrictions);
- political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies (indices and variables include: embassies in country, membership in international organizations, participation in U.N. security council missions, international treaties);
- social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people (indices and variables include: a) data on personal contact: telephone traffic, transfers (percent of GDP), international tourism, foreign population (percentage of total population), international letters (per capita); b) data on information flows: Internet users (per 1000 people), television (per 1000 people), trade and newspapers (percent of GDP); c) data on cultural proximity: number of McDonald's restaurants (per capita), number of Ikea furniture stores (per capita), trade in books (percent of GDP).

(Full information about indices and variables used, sources, definitions and method of forming the index are available on the website of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich [<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>]).

Moreover, as presented in Table 1, we have selected sets of variables indicating levels of individualization, reflexivity and dealing with uncertainties (selected based on theoretical concepts of Giddens [1, p. 53], Beck [34], Bauman [35], Luhmann [36]):

Table 1. Variables indicating levels of individualisation, reflexivity, and dealing with uncertainties.

Individualization	Individualism index (IDV) [25]
	Exclusivism vs. universalism [29]
	In-group collectivism – ‘as is’ and ‘as it should be’ [26, p. 464]
Reflexivity	Traditional values versus secular-rational values [24]
	Survival values versus self-expression values [24, p. 265]
	Monumentalism versus Flexumility [24, p. 369]
Dealing with uncertainties	Uncertainty avoidance index [25, p. 169]
	Uncertainty avoidance dimension – as is’ [26, p. 623]
	Neuroticism [24, p. 286]

The scale of the cultural difference of individualism versus collectivism is widely used. The scale relates to the integration of individuals into groups. Cultures with pronounced individualism are characterized by loose ties between individuals: everyone is supposed to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. Collectivist cultures, in contrast, are characterized by strong, cohesive in-group integration, in which the ‘safety net’ offered by the group is being exchanged for unquestioning loyalty to the group [27]. Even though there is an on-going critical debate regarding the content validity of the items used, labelling or interpreting the dimensions generated in the framework of both Hofstede’s et al. work and in the GLOBE project [29, 37, 38], we included both Hofstede’s dimension on individualism as well as GLOBE’s dimension of in-group collectivism in our analysis. In-group collectivism refers to the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations, families, circle of close friends or other such small groups [26, p. 11–12]. We included both of the variations of GLOBE’s In-group collectivism, one referring to respondents’ estimates of the state of in-group collectivism in their society (in-group collectivism ‘as is’) and the other as their reflection on the ideal state (in-group collectivism ‘as it should be’).

The exclusivism versus universalism dimension [24, p. 375–389] also reflects the way people refer to their group affiliation. Exclusivism was defined as a high importance of in-group cohesion and privileged treatment of in-group members, including nepotism, coupled with a discriminatory attitude toward out-group members and involving their exclusion from the circle of those who deserve privileged treatment. Universalism, in contrast, was defined by Minkov [24, p. 381] as following some universal principles in the treatment of people and rejecting group-based discrimination and nepotism.

Indicators of reflexivity were derived from the work of Inglehart, Baker [28] and Welzel [23, 39] using their distinction between traditional values and secular-rational values as well as survival values and self-expression values. The traditional versus secular-rational values dimension refers to distinctions between societies in which religion and traditional grand institutions such as family or national state are very important and the idea of following the rules and authorities that maintain the order of these grand institutions is highly valued. Societies in which secular-rational values prevail have opposite preferences. In such societies, there is less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority, and deviations from the norms underlying these grand institutions are seen as relatively acceptable. Survival values reflect scarcity norms, emphasizing hard work and self-denial, feelings of threat by foreigners, ethnic diversity, or by cultural change. They emphasize the economic and physical security more than autonomy and self-expression. Self-expression values, in contrast, refer to postmodern values emphasizing the quality of life, emancipation, and other post-materialist priorities, such as an emphasis on expression [40]. As reflexivity may cause dualities and inconsistencies (and may, in such a sense, be also connected to the attitude towards uncertainty), we wanted to add an indicator that would reflect attitudes towards such inconsistencies. We chose to include dimension monumentalism versus flexumility [24, p. 369]. Minkov [24, p. 370-371] explains monumentalism as a cultural syndrome that stands for pride and an invariant self: a conviction that one must have an unchangeable identity and hold on to some strong values, beliefs, and norms. It also reflects an avoidance of personal duality and inconsistency. Flexumility is the opposite of the same syndrome. It reflects humility, changeable self and possible adaptability of beliefs and norms in accordance with practical considerations.

Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance index [25, p. 166–205] refers to the (in)tolerance of ambiguity in society; to the "extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. This feeling is, among other things, expressed through nervous stress and in a need of predictability: a need for written and unwritten rules." [25, p. 167]

Neuroticism [41] is one of five personality dimensions measured by McCrae, referring to its six facets: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability. It is interlinked with a low tolerance for stress or aversive stimuli and the higher possibility to interpret quite ordinary situations as threatening. Hofstede and McCrae show that the five-factor model (FFM) indices use by McCrae associates closely with Hofstede's dimensions [24, p. 288].

Even though the index in the GLOBE project [26] carries the same name as Hofstede's index, it refers to a narrower subject as a result of the differences in questionnaire items. Similarly to Hofstede's index, it aims to establish the level of the need for predictability, but it does not include a question referring to stress or anxiety levels with which such a need would be associated.

Table 2. National scores for selected indicators.

Country	Globalization		Individualization				Reflexivity			Attitude towards uncertainty		
	KOF IG	IDV	EKSK	INGROUP- IS	INGROUP- SHOULD	TRAD vs. SEK	SURVIVAL vs. SELFE	MONUM	UAI	UA- IS	NEUROTIC	
Argentina	60.04	46	555	551	615	-66	38	571	86	365	515	
Australia	80.59	90	119	417	575	/	/	436	51	439	486	
Austria	90.04	55	160	485	527	21	175	/	70	516	483	
Brazil	58.56	38	615	518	515	-98	61	614	76	360	537	
China	59.93	20	615	580	509	80	-116	0	30	494	465	
Columbia	52.25	13	579	573	625	-187	60	667	80	357	/	
Finland	85.01	63	0	407	542	82	112	312	59	502	/	
France	83.28	71	170	437	542	63	113	165	86	443	527	
Germany	82.18	67	120	427	520	138	50	99	65	519	481	
Guatemala	58.83	6	710	563	614	-170	-17	/	101	330	/	
India	49	48	803	592	532	-36	-21	527	40	415	/	
Indonesia	56.03	14	656	568	567	-46	-80	623	48	417	500	
Italy	81.16	76	425	494	572	13	60	352	75	379	526	
Japan	60.11	46	333	463	526	196	-5	40	92	407	507	
Mexico	59.06	30	681	571	595	-147	103	659	82	418	462	
Morocco	58.51	25	872	587	568	-132	-104	890	68	365	503	
Netherlands	90.29	80	28	370	517	71	139	119	53	470	/	
New Zealand	78.4	79	46	367	621	0	186	388	/	475	479	
Nigeria	54.02	30	873	555	548	/	/	908	55	429	478	
Poland	77.98	60	539	552	574	-78	-14	505	93	362	507	
Russia	66.45	39	631	563	579	49	-142	/	95	288	514	
Slovenia	75.42	27	433	543	571	73	36	340	88	378	506	
South Korea	59.69	18	476	554	541	61	-137	43	85	355	484	
Spain	84.33	51	311	579	579	9	54	427	86	397	497	
Sweden	88.76	71	/	366	604	186	235	184	/	532	463	
Switzerland	87.62	68	7	397	494	74	190	242	58	537	/	
Thailand	60.72	20	725	570	576	-64	1	/	64	393	489	
Turkey	69.11	37	585	588	577	-89	-33	668	85	363	514	
UK	86.31	89	57	408	555	6	168	354	35	465	501	
Zambia	54	35	791	584	577	-77	-62	/	50	410	/	

Table 3. Index values and fuzzy database (anchors with calibrated set membership).

Country	Globalization			Attitudes towards uncertainty			Reflexivity			Individualization		
	Index value	Anchor (Category)	Calibrated fuzzy membership (fglobal)	Index value	Anchor (Category)	Calibrated fuzzy membership (funcert)	Index value	Anchor (Category)	Calibrated fuzzy membership (freflex)	Index value	Anchor (Category)	Calibrated fuzzy membership (findivid)
Argentina	60.04	0.33	0.254015	0.85	0	0.134774	-0.42	0.33	0.287642	0.63	0	0.093296
Australia	80.59	0.67	0.755999	-0.6	0.67	0.803038	-0.12	0.67	0.506645	-0.92	0.67	0.896573
Austria	90.04	1	0.895323	-0.72	0.67	0.842319	0.77	1	0.942448	-0.65	0.67	0.800173
Brazil	58.56	0.33	0.225073	1.06	0	0.088489	-0.51	0.33	0.233814	-0.05	0.67	0.418506
China	59.93	0.33	0.251781	-1.58	1	0.97371	0.31	0.67	0.796493	0.29	0.33	0.213917
Colombia	52.25	0	0.128489	0.74	0.33	0.16635	-0.88	0	0.088013	1.13	0	0.024027
Finland	85.01	0.67	0.83283	-0.92	1	0.893395	0.64	1	0.916162	-1.01	1	0.918126
France	83.28	0.67	0.805326	0.64	0.33	0.199957	0.77	1	0.942448	-0.85	0.67	0.876476
Germany	82.18	0.67	0.786124	-0.85	1	0.877427	0.9	1	0.960845	-1.04	1	0.92435
Guatemala	58.83	0.33	0.230173	1.49	0	0.035557	-1.09	0	0.047809	1.20	0	0.019753
India	49	0	0.094182	-0.73	0.67	0.845286	-0.45	0.33	0.268901	0.36	0.33	0.182171
Indonesia	56.03	0.33	0.181205	-0.31	0.67	0.679709	-0.8	0	0.110148	0.76	0	0.066242
Italy	81.16	0.67	0.767119	0.77	0.33	0.157193	0.19	0.67	0.729313	-0.28	0.67	0.581516
Japan	60.11	0.33	0.255443	0.61	0.33	0.210982	0.99	1	0.970123	-0.48	0.67	0.711175
Mexico	59.06	0.33	0.234582	-0.34	0.67	0.694233	-0.6	0.33	0.18741	0.82	0	0.056384
Morocco	58.51	0.33	0.224137	0.35	0.33	0.324404	-1.51	0	0.013408	0.9	0	0.045375
Netherlands	90.29	1	0.897814	-0.82	1	0.869975	0.94	1	0.965268	-1.46	1	0.975976
New Zealand	78.4	0.67	0.710033	-0.86	1	0.879828	0.5	0.67	0.876067	-0.7	0.67	0.822065
Nigeria	54.02	0	0.151333	-0.6	0.67	0.803038	-1.95	0	0.003445	0.61	0	0.09825
Poland	77.98	0.67	0.700654	0.86	0	0.13217	-0.54	0.33	0.217509	0.18	0.33	0.271541
Russia	66.45	0.33	0.404071	1.39	0	0.04414	-0.6	0.33	0.18741	0.55	0	0.114539
Slovenia	75.42	0.67	0.639992	0.67	0.33	0.18937	0.33	0.67	0.806394	0.38	0.33	0.173802
South Korea	59.69	0.33	0.246954	0.39	0.33	0.304986	0.12	0.67	0.684242	0.33	0.33	0.193306
Spain	84.33	0.67	0.822408	0.4	0.33	0.300234	0.06	0.67	0.642596	0.09	0.33	0.325332
Sweden	88.76	1	0.881715	-1.68	1	0.978899	1.1	1	0.994468	-0.53	0.67	0.739644
Switzerland	87.62	1	0.86833	-1.22	1	0.94275	0.95	1	0.966296	-1.43	1	0.973879
Thailand	60.72	0.33	0.268108	-0.09	0.67	0.56392	-0.48	0.33	0.25095	0.83	0	0.054882
Turkey	69.11	0.33	0.474346	0.83	0	0.140112	-0.85	0	0.095799	0.59	0	0.103436
UK	86.31	1	0.851385	-0.76	0.67	0.853915	0.51	0.67	0.879406	-1.13	1	0.940499
Zambia	54	0	0.151057	-0.44	0.67	0.739841	-0.84	0	0.098528	0.78	0	0.06279

The uncertainty-avoidance dimension measured in the GLOBE project refers to the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on established social norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices [26, p.11]. High uncertainty-avoidance societies have a tendency toward intolerance toward ambiguous situations. They are keen on formalized and static procedures, follow rules, and show resistance to change, as change implies risk. In contrast, low uncertainty avoidance in society is associated with greater tolerance for different ideas and willingness to take risks [42].

The national scores for the selected indicators in the 30 countries used in our analysis appear in Table 2 (Sources: KOF IG – KOF Index of Globalization (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2005); IDV - Individualism index (IDV) [22, p. 78-79]; EKSK - Exclusivism vs. universalism [24, p. 383-384]; INGROUP-IS - In-group collectivism – ‘as is’ [26, p. 469]; INGROUP – SHOULD - In-group collectivism – ‘as it should be’ [26, p. 471]; TRAD vs. SEK - Traditional values versus secular-rational values [24, p. 264]; SURVIVAL vs. SELFE - Survival values versus self-expression values [24, p. 264]; MONUM – monumentalism [24, p. 369]; UAI – Uncertainty Avoidance Index [25, p. 168]; UA IS - Uncertainty avoidance dimension – as is [26, p. 269]; NEUROTIC – neuroticism [24, p. 286]) To avoid possible deficiencies and biases of the selected indicators and to better operationalize the complexity of the concepts of individualization, reflexivity, and uncertainty, this study combined all the indicators presented under each theoretical concept in order to calculate its particular index.

Before calculating the overall indices to measure the three concepts described, the study included testing the measures for a possible (multi)dimensionality by the principal component analysis following the criterion that a component should be extracted when its eigenvalue is no lower than one (using the SPSS software). Based on this method, only a single principle component has been extracted for each of the three sets of variables. These three single components explain 71% of the total variance for the set of the individualization-related indicators, 66% of total variance for the set of reflexivity indicators and 69% of total variance of uncertainty indicators, respectively.

The principal component analysis has thus demonstrated that the selected indicators form a single component for each concept thus proving the unidimensionality for each of them. The values for the three overall indices have then been calculated based on the standardized values of the selected indicators.

3. Fuzzy-Set Analysis

The study uses fuzzy-set analysis, which was adjusted to the needs of the sociological analysis by Ragin [43]. Thus, based on the index values from the 30 countries in Table 3, fuzzy sets were formed. (Source: KOF IG – KOF Index of Globalisation (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2005); other (own calculation); PKOF IG – predicted set membership of KOF Index of Globalisation; FKOF IG – calibrated set membership of KOF Index of Globalisation: IATU – Value of

own Index of attitude towards uncertainty; PIATU - predicted set membership of own Index of attitude towards uncertainty; FATU - calibrated set membership of own Index of attitude towards uncertainty; IREF – value of own Index of Reflexivity; PIREF – predicted set membership of own Index of Reflexivity; FIREF – calibrated set membership of own Index of reflexivity; IIND – value of own index of individualisation; PIIND – predicted set membership of own Index of Individualisation; FIND – calibrated set membership of own Index of individualisation) Set membership is defined for every country for the levels of globalization, individualism, reflexivity, and uncertainty. Since we are not dealing with crisp but with fuzzy sets, the value indicating the level of membership in a set can be anywhere between the value of 1 (full membership in a certain set, e.g., in the group of countries with a high level of individualization) and 0 (non-membership in the set of countries with a high level of individualization). Four anchors have been set to define the membership in a set. They were given specific labels and based on the data each country was assigned membership in an individually defined set. Let us illustrate this with the example of the KOF index of the globalization set, where based on four anchors categories were defined as 1 = highly globalized; 0.67 = more globalized than non-globalized; 0.33 = more non-globalized than globalized, and 0 = highly non-globalized. Based on the four anchors, we attributed the predicted set membership for each country. Finally, applying the method of indirect calibration by the R software, we assigned the calibrated fuzzy set membership values for individual countries (see Table 3).

Based on the database acquired in this manner, we tested the necessity and sufficiency of conditions with the fsQCA software. None of the constructed indexes proved to be a necessary condition for a globalized society. To say that individualization, reflexivity, or uncertainty acceptance are not necessary conditions for globalization is to say that it is still possible for a society to be globalized even though these late modern features are absent in a society. In other words, the absence of the late modern features considered does not guarantee the absence of globalization.

As for sufficiency, the analysis shows that individualization by itself is a sufficient condition for globalization. As appearing in Figure 1 and Table 4, the consistency is clearly above the usual threshold (i.e. higher than 0.85), and so is the coverage. This means that the presence of individualization guarantees the presence of globalization.

However, as individualization is not a necessary condition for globalization, we cannot claim that it is impossible to have a globalized society without the presence of individualization. The absence of individualization does not necessarily mean the absence of globalization. Judging by the analysis, there is also an alternative route to globalization for the more collectivist societies. The combination of uncertainty avoidance (opposite of uncertainty acceptance) and reflexivity proved to be a sufficient condition for globalization. In order to interpret this sufficient condition, we looked closely at the individual states it referred to, as presented in Figure 2. The coverage, in this case, is lower because

the combination is characteristic only for six states in our sample: four Southern European and two Asian ones. The cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term \sim funcert*freflex are Slovenia (0.81, 0.64), France (0.8, 0.81), Japan (0.79, 0.26), Italy (0.73, 0.77), South Korea (0.68, 0.25) and Spain (0.64, 0.82). While the European four states fall into categories named ‘globalized’ or ‘more globalized’ (as opposed to ‘non-globalized’ or ‘less globalized’), Japan and South Korea do not (accordingly consistency is lower).

Table 4. Consistency and coverage analysis of sufficient conditions.

Parsimonious solution			
frequency	1.00		
consistency	0.87		
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
findivid	0.74	0.48	0.88
\sim funcert*freflex	0.42	0.12	0.84
solution	0.86		
solution	0.85		

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term findivid: Netherlands (0.98, 0.9), Switzerland (0.97, 0.87), G. Britain (0.94, 0.85), Finland (0.92, 0.83), Germany (0.92, 0.79), Australia (0.9, 0.76), France (0.88, 0.81), New Zealand (0.82, 0.71), Austria (0.8, 0.9), Sweden (0.74, 0.88), Japan (0.71, 0.26), Italy (0.58, 0.77). Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term \sim funcert*freflex: Slovenia (0.81, 0.64), France (0.8, 0.81), Japan (0.79, 0.26), Italy (0.73, 0.77), Korea (South) (0.68, 0.25), Spain (0.64, 0.8).




Figure 1. Individualization as a sufficient condition of globalization.




Figure 2. Uncertainty avoidance combined with reflexivity as a sufficient condition of globalization.

In the case of all the South European states that were included in our analysis, we can see that uncertainty-avoiding societies can be globalized if the features of reflexivity are also present. In the cases of Spain, France or Italy, we could claim that this may be connected to their past colonial ventures, whereas Japan also had a history of building a colonial empire but is nowadays still not among the more globalized societies according to the KOF globalization index. Slovenia and South Korea were colonized territories. EU membership is what all four South European states have in common and distinguishes them from the two Asian ones. By becoming a part of the European Union, the number of social, political and economic international transactions and ties that are used as indices and variables in the KOF index of globalization also increases. However, judging from the socio-political situation in Europe it may still be considered safer to be an EU member, so these states may be actually avoiding uncertainty by engaging with regional international connectivity that impacts their higher score in KOF index of globalization in contrast to Japan or South Korea, where regional integration of such a nature does not exist.

4. Discussion and conclusions

The main motivation for doing this comparative research was observations of the discourse on globalization and interpretations of

relationships to the 'rest of the world' in the case of Slovenia as a comparatively globalized society despite its relative collectivism. We wanted to learn whether some observations about Slovenia can be fitted into a broader pattern and be better understood in comparative perspective. After 25 years of independence, Slovenia remains, according to the KOF index of globalization, among those EU members that are the least open and are (in the European context) weakly embedded in global flows. However, the topic of defining the relationship 'between us and others' is constantly present in the Slovenian public discourse. Most often the discourse is concentrated around the topics of national interest, public interest, state interest (the distinction between these three concepts in the public discourse is not clearly specified and they are often perceived as synonymous), the relationship between the state/public/national and private and with the related issue of the privatization of state property (the issue of state or private ownership and the issue of foreign ownership of Slovenian enterprises) and, only lately, being faced with stronger migration flows, the issue of cultural differences between 'us and them' are becoming a topic. Since Slovenia ranks high on collectivist categories, it is not surprising that the discourse on global issues is also limited to the relationship between 'us and the others', while the issue of defining the relationship between an individual or individual organizations or other social entities does not appear so 'natural' in Slovenia and is virtually absent. The findings of this study indicate that collectivism can dampen participation in a flexible, interdependent global reality. Members of collectivist societies tend to see globalization through the lance of national affiliation (the collective is perceived as the dominant player in global activities), while the ability to be a 'global player' is more rarely attributed solely to individuals, individual organizations or networks, which may influence a smaller amount of global interconnectedness. In contrast, our analysis has shown that individualization in itself is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a society to be more or highly globalized.

Uncertainty acceptance can also be associated with higher levels of globalization, but we have observed exceptions. The four South European societies included in the analysis are the only uncertainty-avoiding societies in our sample who fall into the category we defined as globalized or more globalized (as opposed to non-globalized or less globalized). When starting this research, our expectation was that uncertainty avoidance would be a hindering element for globalization. Judging by these results and the fact that the uncertainty acceptance did not prove to be a necessary condition for the globalization of a society, we can claim that this is not always the case. The argument was that because of the EU integration processes, even some South European collectivistic societies may feel, that not being integrated into a broader European community may present a higher risk compared to not being a member. Uncertainty avoidance coupled with higher levels of reflexivity may result in the possible adaptation of beliefs and norms in accordance with practical considerations. However, additional evidence for a broader set of South European states would be needed, possibly also employing methodological

triangulation, to confirm and explain the pattern in greater depth and to further assess whether such flexumility causes any incongruities or tensions in these societies.

To conclude, the absence of individualization, reflexivity or uncertainty acceptance in a society does not necessarily prevent higher levels of globalization. However, the presence of individualization in a society is a sufficient condition for globalization, while an alternative route to a more globalized collectivist society can be found only in the European territory in rare cases of reflexive societies avoiding uncertainty.

Giddens [1, p. 70] understood globalization as the outcome of the completion of the modernization and universalization of modern institutions and sets of modern values that operate on a global scale. The late-modern features discussed here are theoretically seen as a result of the intensification of features of modernity (including globalization); therefore, as follow-up research we would also suggest reversing the causality logic of our analysis and empirically explore whether levels of globalization of a society condition individualization, reflexivity, or dealing with uncertainty in a society. Specifically, if late-modern features are consequences of modern processes and if they do not necessarily condition economic, political and social globalization, their possible increased universalization (as proposed by theories of modernization) may lead to qualitatively new forms and substances of global interconnectedness that may not resemble globalization processes as we thematize them today. What is also needed is a broader discussion in the scientific community about the ways we can measure both globalization and the discussed late-modern features in order to reduce conceptual dilemmas and quandaries and to form appropriate and broader comparative empirical evidence for many theoretically grounded claims in these social fields. Broader comparative evidence would enable quantitative analysis, add to the validity of claims and provide more profound explanations about underlying factors affecting the relationship between globalization and late-modern features.

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