

---

## HEIDEGGER'S SCIENCE

Klement Mitterpach and Martin Štúr\*

*Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Hodžova 1, 949 74 Nitra,  
Slovak Republic*

(Received 12 October 2016, revised 9 December 2016)

---

### Abstract

The end of the Philosophy represents for Heidegger the task of undertaking a 'matter-of-fact' (sachlich) approach which could be expected to show, wherefrom we could characterize the residual uses of the term 'philosophy' as significant, or even symptomatic in historical perspective. The paper targets the significance of Heidegger's understanding of Philosophy and comments on its connection with Heidegger's idea of science (Wissenschaft), or rather his idea of making the 'Wissenschaft' an issue to be thought through in case the philosophical-political engagement comes into question, or in case Heidegger is interpellated to respond to political events, as he did in his Rektoratsrede (Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universität). This creates an opportunity to view into the connection between Theology and Ontology in Heidegger's early thought and to see that Heidegger's case becomes an open view to danger in Philosophy without politics and politics without Philosophy, rather than an example of some 'philosophical politics', a warning which does not even raise Heidegger controversy as a philosophical one.

*Keywords:* science, philosophy, Sachlichkeit, Rector's speech, politics

---

### 1. Introduction

The importance of the question concerning the subject of Philosophy has diminished since Heidegger opened the question on the wake of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, although he had been struggling to keep it open ever since in all of his oeuvre. It seemed that the question has ever been and, even would be, re-opened regularly whenever there was a need to give notice to twists and turns of philosophical thought. However, nowadays, we tend to be rather suspicious about such critical re-identification of Philosophy. It resembles an all too easy false self-legitimation, when such questions are rhetorically posed anytime one wants to disguise the fact that there no longer is or has never been such thing as philosophical subject proper. Does the question not function as a cheap trick which pretends to make a bold decisive step towards definitive answer only to hide the fact that what has already been left in the past and became one of its once and for all finished episodes still lurks in the background of our everyday practices? To refuse the disguise would also mean that any aspiration to

---

\*Corresponding author, e-mail: mstur@ukf.sk

questions concerning the end of Philosophy in any other than historical way would be excluded and identified merely as other feeble attempts at re-actualising the philosophical past. Such attempts would have to be recognized as blasphemous and ignorant of the clarity of the irretrievable past from the very outset.

Within the course of this factual view, the aspiration to Philosophy, possessing its very own subject, has been defeated by the course of the rise and development of scientific practice, which simply does not recognize, but most of all, delegitimizes the philosophical subject by simply imposing a normative setting that requires no meta-scientific discourse. Science thus strikes two birds with one stone: the idea of Philosophy playing its own game as well as philosophy as a meta-discourse concerning the scientific subject proper. The propriety of asking is defeated by the normatively recognizable scientific question. If Alain Badiou says, that “there is no philosophy of defeat” [1], one could say it also holds for Philosophy of end, moreover, philosophy of the end of Philosophy, which could aspire to overcoming the defeat in disguise of the problem of the ‘historicity’ of being itself. Would this not mean that there is, after all, no such question as ‘what is Philosophy’ either? Is Philosophy not just a name referring to a bygone phase of the development of scientific thinking, which eventually shows that Philosophy does not end in such a simple way [2] (failing to follow the self-standing reality which breaks any rationally-based metaphysical frameworks), but more than that, is defeated anytime it reactivates its hyper-critical disguise or attempts to provoke science on account of scientific ‘assumptions’, ‘reductionism’, or its vulnerability to political abuse? How is it then with Heidegger’s philosophical mission, which seems to fit this picture perfectly?

## **2. The corporate model of Philosophy**

Heidegger’s thought displays not only questions concerning the end of Philosophy or the proper subject of ‘philosophical’ thought. It is also believed to display a repulsive attitude towards Science. Once the privileged, foundational role of philosophy is considered desperately out-dated, the corporate model is done with for good as well. However, the only sign that Heidegger’s discourse might not be so pathetically vain seems to reside in the fact that interdisciplinary discourses could still be vaguely considered philosophical, or to be more precise, they contain no decisive urge to erase and totally refuse a ‘philosophical’ identity, insofar they do not exclude Philosophy as an impossible endeavour, but rather believe to represent its non-metaphysical substitution today. Above that, Philosophy is still bestowed with a certain number of educational or discursive roles in promoting social and cultural awareness of the basic scientific and non-scientific attitudes towards several vital questions, which, as we still believe, keep fuelling public debate or influence political decisions today. Heidegger’s proverbial constatation of the end of Philosophy has despite that never seemed to coincide with the end of asking about the proper subject of thought (Denken).

On the contrary, according to him, the end itself eventually becomes possible only this way. So, the end of philosophy designates the moment one can assert expectations about truly asking, what the subject, in fact, was. The scientific view would nevertheless confirm that if the triumph of the sciences still echoes anything like the Beginning (Anfang) of the philosophical thought, it can only sound theological, that is, it seems to substitute the scientific potential of philosophy with a reactionary return to religious belief, or even more likely, turn to New Age pantheistic spirituality which is often believed to be exemplified precisely by the late Heideggerian stance. Heidegger's decisiveness about the end of Philosophy seems to stand in contrast to the present situation when philosophers rather avoid pronouncing the judgement over Philosophy as definitive. This, however, makes them turn to commenting on number of histories of the up-to-date topics which are no longer considered exclusively or genuinely philosophical at all. To preserve some legitimacy of the philosophical in working out 'histories' or 'genealogies' of ideas, does not automatically exempt such enterprises from the judgment of Science. From the scientific point of view these 'philosophical enterprises' are, despite their clinging to their purely assisting role in exposition of the phenomena, perceived as pseudo-scientific anyway. At the same time, philosophers tend to accept the particularization of several scientifically induced "problems" with a kind of "modest" or even "prudent" [3] proclamation that Philosophy will never challenge the outcomes of any scientific exploration, still less seize them as issues of a purely philosophical exploration. Despite that, pronouncing amateurish or popularizing stances one can still form around the results of scientific research in a public debate might be even generally supported unless they do not introduce themselves as genuinely philosophical.

This position, nevertheless, still tends to show Philosophy as a birthplace of different opinions that can be formed around an issue, so that these positions could support or subvert publicly held political attitudes of the day. Heidegger's attempt has also been inserted into such role, but above all that, is nowadays believed to be revealed to found the political positions he held in 1930s. So instead of looking for the political setting which could fit Heidegger's ontology as it used to be done in 1960s, nowadays we rather tend to have identified in Heidegger a philosophy which has ever been and could anytime again become the ground of any future fascism or anti-Semitism. Heidegger has not only become one of the influences on several philosophical directions dealing with cultural topics of the day but, even more so, has become significant as an exemplary case of the naivety and the danger of linking ontologically oriented thought with politics. To identify Heidegger's philosophical stance as inherently Nazi, nevertheless, fires the questions about the status of ontologically devoted thinking today, and this holds even more when it concerns thinking engaged in establishing (or uncovering) the proper subject of ontological exploration, as Heidegger's thought undoubtedly was. The corporate model of science one would expect to spot in Heidegger's claim to a proper philosophical engagement, does not give a true picture of Heidegger's drive towards 'matter-

of-factness' (Sachlichkeit) of Philosophy, although it seems to be without any serious legitimization used by Heidegger himself in those cases when he allows that a political context may be subverted by the neutrality of ontological meaning and ontological historisation of the existence become a politically significant program. The end of Philosophy, therefore, represents for Heidegger the task of undertaking a 'sachlich', matter-of-fact, approach which could be expected to show, wherefrom we could characterize the residual uses of the term 'philosophy' as significant, or even symptomatic in historical perspective.

We want to target this significance as the aim of the paper and comment on Heidegger's understanding of Philosophy with his idea of Science (Wissenschaft), or rather his idea of making the 'Wissenschaft' an issue to be thought through in case the philosophical-political engagement comes into question, or when the philosopher is interpellated to respond to political events, as he did in his Rektoratsrede (Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universität). This moreover creates an opportunity to view into the connection between Theology and Ontology in Heidegger's early thought (commenting on Aristotle) and to see that we can understand more about the controversy this way than by addressing Heidegger's thought as the authentic philosophy (ontology) of Nazism, to-be-indexed philosophy or, finally, no philosophy but "introduction of Nazism to philosophy" [4, p. 255] as the title of E. Faye's work actually sounds.

### **3. Introduction to Phenomenology and the question of Science**

Any attempt to reassess the debate around Philosophy - Philosophy neither necessarily contradicting, nor essentially depending on Science, having its own tasks, although not necessarily a limited space/place in the grid of scientifically explorable subjects - seems to repeat a gesture which has become significant for Christian theology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The argument about irreducibility of a secular ambition to explore world thoroughly in all its dimensions and therefore treat the ambition itself as a scientific object of a particular kind, must from a theological point of view be reread as a misinterpretation of some other primordial motivation which can be explained only from within the fall, which the scientific ambition causes once we have adopted it as an aim. The fall from primordial must be reversed as a key to Science proper. However, this is not to be re-instated but legitimized as a historical explanatory position, which does not attempt to inscribe into the actual reality, but rather aspires to be recognized as its authentic reference point. The view does not even correct the drift to fall, it merely introduces ontological measure as the one which allows one to 'reclaim' the fall and turn it into 'situation of decision'. Does, however, Heidegger use such theological stance formally in order to fill it with strong ontological orientation, with an adherence to the ontological problem? [5] Does he use it as the core wherefrom one can read existential as well as historical situatedness of Science? And if he does so, did he propose a procedure to be followed to reinvent the origin of scientific thought and recreate the authentic situation in order to end Philosophy?

Heidegger's early writing contains many signs of what has been often thought to represent his later thought. Moreover, the idea of scientificity is one of the central issues, mainly when Heidegger elucidates reasons why Husserl's phenomenology had become one of his decisive influences. Above that, it appears even more as an exemplary case to demonstrate not just some new branch of Philosophy, or a new way of philosophizing, but the 'matter-of-fact issue at stake' (Sache), which has been present, although unrecognized, in the course of history of philosophy since its very beginning. Even if Heidegger wrote in his famous essay, a report on his encounter with phenomenology, that phenomenology is just a term naming the way thinking is to appear and disappear ever again as a designation of a task, it could be emphasized that it is not just a task of working out its proper, and therefore, 'phenomenological', access to any subject, but it is a task of being able to disappear for the sake of the 'matter of thinking' (Sache des Denkens) [6]. The singular form of the term itself (Sache des Denkens) indicates a shift, which could evoke a kind of monism, if not mono-theism, of the question we are subjected to once we start to take phenomenology as a 'visor', which gives us slit-view to the original, yet merely 'indicated' discovery of an authentically legitimized thought. Heidegger was not looking for a subject pertaining exclusively to Philosophy, an 'untouchable' among other sciences. When starting the analysis of Husserl's Logical Investigations, Heidegger highlights the fact that behind the 'traditional' way of dealing with the area of logic, Husserl introduces a very decisive way of *Forschung*, inquiry (investigation), which attempts to reveal and bring forth the 'subject' of the Science that resembles sciences which, in fact, have no subjects themselves, as it seems. (The Logical Investigations are intended to be the kind of preparatory labours that for once first seek to bring the object of this discipline into view, just as if it appeared that sciences devoid of any object at all were being pursued [7].) At the very beginning of the course, he states, that 'Philosophy is over', however, in no nostalgic manner. "Passion of questioning genuinely and rightly" (Leidenschaft des echten und rechten Fragens) [7, p. 1] Heidegger proposes as the proper mood or attitude of his endeavour is neither a restoration of Philosophy, nor a conservative counter-point to the tendencies of the day. Heidegger seems to take over phenomenological ambition in reinventing the ground of the philosophical enterprise, and that not as much to remind us of the idea of proper subject of Philosophy as a field of scientifically irreducible objects which can be described as these 'Sachen selbst' phenomenologically. It is rather supposed to remind us of the 'matter-of-fact issue' Science itself represents as to the 'matter' wherefrom we understand what in fact Science does and means.

The true questioning, however, is rather supposed to display Philosophy as the 'tip' of an iceberg which is becoming accessible through what appears above water, but is pictured quite differently once we start to see it as a rather unrepresentative part of the whole thing under, not merely as a harmless floating piece of ice. Husserl's phenomenological attitude, on the contrary, acts like a typically modernist invention which revolutionizes the traditional philosophy

and distances itself from it, although it admits that modern (post-Kantian) philosophy generally had tendency to get rid of its metaphysics and allow even the transformation of its very own self in order to become scientific, in fact, more scientific than Science itself. The difference comes to the fore even more once we notice how Heidegger analyses Husserl's implicit commitment to the regime of modern project of scientific cognition (*Erkennen*).

Heidegger, however, did not work out a critique of Husserl's idea of phenomenology. Heidegger rather attempted to resurface how, in general, phenomenology, as if from nowhere, rediscovered the idea of self-appearance of things as the proper aim of philosophical work. ("What is primordial is that, in the course of working on consciousness in the direction of a clarification in an epistemically critical sense, what matters above all is *to bring* what is to be worked on *into view as it is in itself*." [7, p. 44]) At the centre of Husserl's project of clearing the consciousness as the proper region of possibly innerly intuited (perceived) things (things which allow the approach and the experience of their evidence), as well as in Husserl's motivation at finally working out scientific philosophy, Heidegger identifies care as a founding, although phenomenologically ignored, commitment, present not only in the scientific motivation, but also in the idea of self-appearing of the very own subject matter of the scientific philosophy itself. Basically, Heidegger shows that Husserl's initiative brings us again to the structure of the philosophical insight in general, recognizable in the Greek philosophical commitment, which is, therefore, proved to be more than only a naïve predecessor of the modern Husserlian enterprise. The Greek philosophical commitment rather resembles the forgotten bulk of ice hidden underwater, which has undergone the transformations of philosophical problem ever since Philosophy started its 'guessing the proportions and shape' of the whole 'floating thing'. The call for 'scientificity' is often expected to be read as the demand of adjusting Philosophy to scientific work, but with Heidegger we should rather understand it as the care for Science itself which resides at the root of any exploration done since Philosophy emerged.

According to Heidegger, Husserl still relies on the consciousness as the very ground of discovering the possible evidence of the properly scientific, that means logical, objects (concepts) themselves. Phenomenology, therefore, appears as a concrete realization of care (*Sorge*) which eventually dissolves into the thing it has cared for. The idea of dissolution has multiple senses, but with respect to Heidegger's further understanding of Philosophy and Science, it should be viewed mainly in its historical sense. It not only explains the way Heidegger relates to Husserl's phenomenology - phenomenology as a historical re-discovery of the philosophical 'matter-of-factness' (*Sachlichkeit*) and its roots - but it also reveals the condition under which this 'matter-of-factness' comes out: The call for scientific legitimisation of philosophy, which casts the re-appearance of the problem of the very own 'issue' of Philosophy together with the question of the roots of Science. This particular motive, however, stands out most vividly in Heidegger's own later theme of the end of Philosophy and

'matter-of-factness' in its present-day technological development, which from this point of view inevitably attains its historical significance only as an endpoint of the historical accomplishment of the western metaphysics. This means, it becomes significant precisely on the level of historical-philosophical happening, the level of dissolution of Philosophy as we have known it, or as what used to be recognized under the title in a particular historical period. In this sense, Heidegger first identifies Husserl's enterprise as being operative within a care for knowledge, a special care for what it means to know, and how, what we call 'knowledge', can be in fact actualized and reassured precisely as 'the' knowledge we possess.

It was obviously not the stock of data and information we shared as common knowledge, but rather the status of the known, which attracted Husserl's attention. For this reason, Heidegger determines the care of the phenomenological investigation as the one of the 'known knowledge' (erkannte Erkenntnis). "The aim in phenomenological research is for this care about already known knowledge to reach a basis in the matter [sachlichen Boden], from which the justifiability of all knowing and cultural being can become genuine [echt]." [7, p. 44] It is precisely a 'culture grounded on Science' which generally responds to the claim under which the consciousness becomes the very theme of phenomenology - the consciousness where the 'knowing of the known' is to be established as a way of 'securing' the knowledge itself. Thus, consciousness is required to display an "absolutely binding character" [7, p. 61], rather than focus on 'what is to be known', which, considering the self-interpretation of the scientific knowledge, "is from the outset secondary" [7, p. 73]. Loosing what is cared for has, therefore, been done in Husserl's phenomenology in an exemplary fashion just because this 'loosing oneself in the thing which is cared for' happens as a disguise of this loss in the losing itself, which is, according to Heidegger, called for precisely when we follow the scientific neglect of any question concerned with anything like proper subject-matter of Science. These determinations do not automatically resurface with the claim to scientificity in philosophy, but they even cannot be directly (thematically) approached in their own right unless scientificity itself appears as a kind of a being. Without this it more often represents a criterion which prefigures possible ways of encountering what is to be considered a being and what is not, what Heidegger recognized as typical of modern idea of Science.

#### **4. Heidegger's science as a theology or a totalitarian terror?**

The very opening of Heidegger's 1924/24 Marburg Lectures *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* deals with Science while Philosophy is mentioned in a way we usually recognize as representative of his later thinking: "...not even Philosophy should be expected. It is my conviction that Philosophy is at an end. We stand before completely new tasks that have nothing to do with traditional philosophy. This view is, however, only a clue. Only facts of the matter are of significance. Definition, classification, explication, and disputation

are of secondary importance.” [7, p. 1] Science is named here as an outstanding way of the existential confrontation. Moreover, it is the theoretical form of scientific life, not ‘science’ itself, which does not come into terms with the claim to science (*Wissenschaft*). All the moments of Heidegger’s *Introduction* focus on the matter-of-fact approach to understanding science as a claim which coincides with the end of Philosophy. At the same time the response to the call for “the science” requires “to free oneself from a tradition which in Greek philosophy was genuine: scientific behavior as theory” [7, p. 2]. Heidegger’s image of hellenophile as well as scientophobe are to be dealt with as obstructions to at least a basic understanding of the thought, which decides for ‘*Sachlichkeit*’, whatever comes. Even if Heidegger’s articulation would change, we could assume that the pressure of matters to be confronted had ever remained Heidegger’s - even if later almost idiomatic - key issue.

Apart from that, it is precisely Heidegger’s infamous Rectoral Address that reintroduces Science as the way one undergoes the crucial, now historical and institutional confrontation with the destiny of the West. How does it come to be that when he inserted the claim into the frame of political situation, it suddenly yielded meaning which one cannot read without today? Or, is it on the contrary, a political content being unfolded when the moment came and released the consequences of the innocent ‘*Sachlichkeit*’ in the form of a political totalitarianism or terror? The first part of *Rektoratsrede* sounds just as if the prologue of *Introduction* would be used in a politically significant situation. The question is: Is it politics which acquires new meaning and is able to withstand the distress of radical uncertainty and change, or is it Heidegger’s thought which breaks and gets imbued by the real political machinery which enforces its own idea of *Sachlichkeit*, *Geschichtlichkeit* (historicity) and *Wissenschaft*? After all, it is not only the ontological violence of the law, as a violence of any norm, but the violence it implies to the historically excluded (non-Germans).

The fact that Science as well as Philosophy both remain in certain respect tied to the ‘*sachlich*’ - to what he previously calls ‘*Tat-bestand*’ (fact of the matter) to preserve the historical evidence of the particular ways the ‘*Sache*’ itself is uncovered - shows, after all, that one can be confronted with Science within the exclusive form of life (*Lebensform*). This form of life is from the very start indebted to the theory in its ontologically unjustified dominance, which has blocked the way to ‘being scientifically’ itself. It is, therefore, no longer a theoretical insistence on fixating the subject matter, but on initiating the sight of the theoretical as a life form which has decided to live out from its radical comportment to things known. Philosophy is similarly, however, an ultimately radicalized, decision to live out of the comportment and lead it towards its own self-confrontation. This could also contain the question, what is it that makes us live from the comportment to what we habitually experience as ‘home’, one nevertheless cannot confront with unless the unhomeliness itself is radicalized, as Heidegger, reading *Antigone*, writes much later [8]. Heidegger did not call us to attach to some gnostic primordial origin which would in a perverted way still feed our technologically institutionalized everyday lives. He not only

emphasized the correlative nature of the Beginning, but also the fact that it itself appeared as its own barrier, as a thing that conquers and in its institutional prefiguration forms our ideas of 'matter-of-factness' itself. Beginning (Anfang), therefore, does not mean the fresh source of non-institutionalized experience, but an Event of asserting the situation of confrontation with the sources of a current institutionalized practice.

If there is a reflection which forms an 'existential attitude' it usually evokes a "tense situation in which each particular individual must find courage to be" and even "courage to face everydayness" [9]. Being pictured this way as 'existential', it is usually described as being out of touch or even fleeing from the institutional practice, although institutions represent a crucial part of everydayness, one is supposed to face. One might refer to existential ethics as a paradigm which managed to overcome Kantian ethical formalism by reinforcing the idea of the unique place human being occupies in the world [10] and thus perhaps is even supposed to challenge the formalism institutions are believed to be built upon. Even 'individual experience and personal engagement', if they are pointed out as common features held by existentially inspired theology nevertheless must belong to the "existential questions, which must be re-articulated in the light of contemporary experience and attitudes" [11]. Such re-assertions of the existential stance, therefore, inevitably contain the confrontation with institutional practice, which might be institutionally supported as a sympathetic personal attitude, unless it does not challenge the institutional practice itself on account of its survivalist or performative strategy, which, apart from many other things, does not allow a reactivation of the question of meaning of science it institutionally covers. One could even assume that even those concepts of institutionalised practice which no longer share the simplistic individual-institution opposition, but try to test other models of institutional practice, e. g. Latour's *oligoptikon*, which vitally depend on their ability to "initiate exchanges and admit extrinsic elements" [12], do so in order to prove that there is no need to provoke institutional change philosophically. Heidegger has, nevertheless, taken the step, although, as Žižek remarked, "the right step in the wrong direction" [13].

To experience the loss of the origin philosophically - believed to be caused by an institutionalisation of scientific practice - means to lose the loss itself, as far as the situation is opened again. This creates pressure not only on our way of using the signification 'science' but on the institutional organization of science, which, apart from many other things, means that the normative appeal to infamous 'Student's Law' in Heidegger's *Rektorsrede* [14] can no longer pretend to raise claim to an individual withstanding the ontological 'Wissenschaft', but to an institutional exclusive practice, which Heidegger refers to as self-assertion (*Selbstbehauptung*) of the university. The existential subversivity of the substantially grounded thinking nowadays seems to pair well with the humanist assertion of the humanist non-scientific mission of university and with a sterile appeal to its political normative preservation. Heidegger's *Rektorsrede* displays all the existentialist features although in historical, but

most of all, institutional platform which, however, seems to fatally discredit not only Heidegger, but also any attempt at existential-ecstatic eventualization of, and confrontation with the institutional ground of science. Heidegger did not attempt to de-institutionalize university, or to withdraw from scientific rigor, but to 're-assert' university, as he believed this would be the most 'revolutionary' act triggered by the institution. Such institutional-existential re-assertion itself raises science to its utmost scientificity, which not only cannot subvert the justification of the normative institutional Nazi practice, but even less can offer a justification where there is no place for demand to insert one.

The problem to be dealt with is not that Heidegger attempted to justify Nazi Student's Law, but that he believed his justification can imbue the law with meaning which must permeate its execution and guide it as a practice of a service (*Dienst*) to an existentially pointed confrontation with radical uncertainty of the scientific situation. The fact is that the normative aspect of *Student Law* could effectively do its job and, even more, could absorb any 'philosophical', ontological, or other attempts at its justification, without losing its control over the executive force it stood for. It was not naïve to believe that if one changes the meaning he also changes the practice, but that one can change the meaning by slipping the existential justification under the law which, once issued, was executed without any respect to any (philosophical) justification or interpretation. It is not about accommodating the real effect of Heidegger's support by regarding his motivation, just because this no longer is about Heidegger's philosophical support, or simply about the support of Heidegger as philosopher. Heidegger's endorsement of Nazi practice definitely does not explain his philosophical attempt at its justification, which otherwise definitely could be also non-philosophical, private and even more straightforward, even if representing the support of a philosopher; if, of course, it was not for the philosopher who was historically 'withstanding' the end of Philosophy and at the same time confronting the institution with its historicity. Heidegger's Speech was ontological just because it attempted to break the politically shared meanings of justification and support for the sake of political justification of ontology.

*Rektoratsrede*, however, can be regarded straightforward in a different sense. Heidegger definitely believed Nazism was in need of Philosophy, although he underestimated the fact that it was not. More than that, however, he believed that it is precisely Philosophy that alone can put (interpret) Nazism in its right place and by doing so even interpellate it. From this point we can see the difference between accommodating to Nazism, and accommodating Nazism to Philosophy, which in fact from the ontological point of view cannot be identified as Nazi unless one does not take ontology as abstract illustration of the political body or act. The Philosophy qua Science of the Rector's Speech did not even wanted to become Nazi philosophy, but wanted Nazi politics to become philosophical. It was not Heidegger's choice to support Nazism or not to do so - precisely as a philosopher he did not wanted to see it this way - but to graft it with the Philosophy or leave it to the technologically based manipulative

practice (means: to stand aside and thus support anyway). The problem of ontological-existential stand rests in that it has no such thing as 'fighting against', but most of all no theory of subverting the institutional practice other than its attempts at testing the authenticity of our everyday habitual accommodation to it. Philosophy as the confrontation with the claim of the authentic is itself accommodated and authenticated by Nazism. With Heidegger there probably was no expectation of authentic policy for certain ontology, but belief in an authentic moment for 're-assessing' Ontology itself. The question still remains - is such reassessment of Ontology in general an essence of Nazi political practice, or is Ontology a tool for confronting oneself with and breaking into its ideological universe?

Heidegger's 'failure' (probably the only thing that could be called precisely a 'failure' in the whole case, which cannot be classified defensively as 'failure') rests more likely on his belief that such 'ontological' justification can subvert any normatively construed law by the existential-ontological re-assertion and would endow the law with its proper (authentic) meaning and power to question any politically forced practice as inauthentic. Unlike the law itself, the existential-ontological meaning revealed itself not to have any resistance against affirmation of the ideological practice. Heidegger's endorsement (even though he might have supported it anyway) of Nazi regime would never have happened had Heidegger not believed the regime can be philosophically intervened and finally transfigured into an ontological-existential, historical Event, or at least had he not believed the Philosophy can activate the authentically political event at all.

Questions to be dealt with are not those of Heidegger's guilt or a secret code of Nazi ontological configuration hidden under the mask of Philosophy which more than anything else pushed us to release the issue at stake from all too hasty identifications, from all tendencies to get rid of the philosophical past, whereas avoiding contrastive confrontation with it. Heidegger as a Nazi supporter and anti-Semite, nevertheless, becomes a paradigmatic case, although we still do not know what he is the exemplary case of, precisely when he is taken as a philosopher. This holds even if we take his philosophy as Nazi and anti-Semitic in its very core, because precisely in its ardent 'matter-of-factness' it shows the very ambiguity and danger of Philosophy without politics, and politics without Philosophy. These must be questioned much more than what we intuitively and automatically tend to grasp as the dangers of Philosophy becoming politics, with Heidegger exposed as its clearest and deterrent example.

An existential affirmation of science, as a claim to re-think, that means, re-establish one's commitment to the scientific practice on accord of its explicitly formulated ontological meaning and aim cannot even individually happen unless the institutional practice of Science excludes the existential ontology of Science as a theological or totalitarian terrorist practice, which is the way it is classified from the point of view of institutionalized science today, whenever it encounters any challenge to the meaning of Science. The anathema of philosophical-political practice today is Philosophy as an end. Not its own

end, but an end (meaning ‘purpose’) of any discussion concerning ethics. The ethical question should therefore always head towards asking how we actually deal (not how we should deal!) with the claim ‘to know’ institutionally?

## 5. Conclusions

Despite a common image of Heidegger as a major philosophical opposition to the scientific philosophy, it is precisely Heidegger who issues a call for the end of Philosophy, although one which is not inspired by Science itself and its aspirations on cognitive autonomy. However, it is precisely in the name of Science (*Wissenschaft*) that philosophy is to be ended and Science be recognized as a failure to do so. Heidegger considers that Philosophy be ended in order to realize the task of scientificity itself which does not pertain to modern Science, nor to Philosophy. To make Philosophy end is for Science an impossible and generally nowadays almost unrecognized task, mainly because it is generally identified as an inevitable by-product of scientific progress. On accord of this, scientificity has, according to Heidegger, ever been the claim embodied by Philosophy and, therefore, Science itself has ever subsisted on a ground which has never been its own, or rather has never been erected as a determination supposed to be exhausted by the scientific identity we adhere to since the rise of the modern era. It is, however, not the Science which lives in a self-deception - in fact, there is no problem with its functioning and doing well - but it is Science itself which prevents us from confronting with ‘science’ as a still unknown, unparalleled assignment to (human) existence.

Scientificity, therefore, in Heidegger’s vein, does not enter the scene as a philosopher’s provocation, confronting science with the assumption scientists cannot analyse, but as an assumption precisely scientists are basically protected against, resistant to, thanks to their view misled by the clarity of the normatively based mission scientists avow. It is not Philosophy which disguises its own emptiness and overall lack of any proper subject by raising false claim of ‘scientificity’, but from the very start it is the Science which is highlighted as a call to Philosophy and claim to Philosophy. Therefore, Philosophy can no longer be alive, although Science is not the agency to ‘end’ it. To defeat Philosophy might as well mean to become its sole unwilling bearer. Science, according to Heidegger, not only cannot pursue the task of ‘ending’ Philosophy, but it itself rather becomes the sole victim of Philosophy as a contagion precisely at the very moment it starts to rely on its normative autonomy and thus promote the very metaphysical (non-scientific) idea of self-elucidation as well as the non-political identity of the promoter of enlightened popularisation of the scientific world-view itself.

Even Heidegger’s ever-reverberating remarks about Science, which as proclaimed by him, are philosophical in their core, do not point to the primacy of Philosophy - as if to have the proper access to the question, we only need to turn the historical and factual vision upside down and declare Science a philosophy against Philosophy being taken as just an infant science. It rather shows Science

as a disguise of Philosophy which has miscomprehended scientificity as purely cognitive claim and, therefore, blocked the way to seeing it as an ontological one, mainly, when the Science itself steps into the front to represent an autonomous ontological bias for all dimensions of human life and action. Finally, we could say, Heidegger's pointing to Science proper does not attack Science 'on its own ground' but calls Science to end its blindness towards scientificity, understood in the sense of a claim which has the power to open the issue of Philosophy again. Doing this, in effect, one could take the chance not to misrepresent the agent of the task as well as the way Philosophy is to be ended again.

### Acknowledgment

This paper is the outcome of the Research Project entitled 'Kierkegaard and the Crisis of the Contemporary World' (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main).

### References

- [1] A. Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, Continuum, London, 2009, 3.
- [2] M. Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, Harper, San Francisco, 1976, 373-392.
- [3] Q. Meillasoux, *After Finitude*, Continuum, London, 2008, 13.
- [4] E. Faye, *Philos. Today*, **55(3)** (2011) 253-267.
- [5] I. Thomson, *J. Hist. Philos.*, **41(4)** (2003) 515-542.
- [6] M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, 82.
- [7] M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1997, 39.
- [8] M. Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1996, 115.
- [9] M. Pavlíková, *Eur. J. Sci. Theol.*, **12(4)** (2016) 111-119.
- [10] P. Kondrla and M. Pavlíková, *Eur. J. Sci. Theol.*, **12(3)** (2016) 101-111.
- [11] R. Králik, *Eur. J. Sci. Theol.*, **11(4)** (2015) 179-188.
- [12] A. Gogora, *Filozofia*, **67(6)** (2012) 485-490.
- [13] S. Žižek, *Less than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism*, Verso, London, 2012, 879.
- [14] M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe 16. Reden un andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2000, 107-117.