
EMERGENT-THEISM(S), ALTERNATIVE AND INEXPLICABLE BRINGING CARTESIAN THEISM BACK INTO SCIENCE AND RELIGION

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Abstract

Emergentism is a paradigm often used to bridge the worlds of Science and religion through complex lawful processes connecting the mind to the physical world (i.e., where the mind, construed as a property or a substance, is the lawful consequent of some highly complex neural structure or the brain is the proximate cause of the mind). In recent discussions, some philosophers and theologians have even gone so far as to use the emergence concept as a way to bridge God to the physical world. However, with some pushback in the philosophy of mind, we are beginning to notice a shift closer to older models of the mind. In the present article, I show why this is a good move. I go on to argue that that emergent-theism(s) confront significant challenges given the models of laws on offer and that something like Cartesian theism seems to have the resources to accommodate the regularities of natural or physical events, the potential irregularities (e.g., the origination of minds), and has some resources to capture the benefits of contemporary emergent-theism(s).

Keywords: substance dualism, naturalism, haecceity, panentheism, deification

1. Introduction

Francis Bacon describes idols as those false or phantom beliefs that commonly lead people into “empty and idle fancies”, and of which there were different types, one of which was the confusion of things that don’t exist with things that do exist [*Novum Organum*, Aphorism XXXVIII, LIX, XLIII]. Emergentism may fall into this trapping. Rather than acting as an actual bridge between Science and religion, it often fails to capture both. In an attempt to bridge these worlds, many emergentists have even tried to account for God *via* a physical emergentist process. However, it seems there is something fundamentally missing in the emergentist framework that fails to capture the nature of the physical world in addition to the immaterial world, namely, the

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Divine mind. While these alternative theisms promise a possible solution to the religion/Science divide, they fail to deliver [1]. As with all dialectics, novel alternatives often scratch at something that was otherwise missing or needing development in older models, but it is also the case that those newer models are pulled back closer to the older models. Something like this seems to be the case when we look at the recent discussions in science and religion concerning God's relationship to the world. With all that is desirable about emergent-theism(s), Cartesian theism or Theistic dualism seems to have the upper hand in discussions about the relation between God and the natural world, and with some modification it might capture some of the benefits found in emergentism.

In what follows, I explore two alternative theisms that attempt to merge the world of science and religion. First, I briefly set out Samuel Alexander's naturalistic emergentism. Second, I briefly set out Philip Clayton's non-natural emergent-panentheism. Third, I raise several concerns for both views and argue that God is a mind in the Cartesian sense. Fourth, I argue that emergent-minds are inconsistent with the models of natural laws with which we are presently working. Finally, I advance two alternative theisms, namely a version of Cartesian panentheism and good ole Cartesian theism.

Before pressing forward, let me list some of what I see as the desirables in the Science-religion discussions.

1. A Divine-world relation must have some account of the regularity of laws.
2. A Divine-world relation must have some account for potential irregularities in nature.
3. A Divine-world relation should bring the transcendent God closer to the immanent realm.

With these desirables now before us, let us also consider that the challenge for emergent-theism seems to be two-fold. First, the quasi-naturalistic explanation (i.e., physical events are explained in lawful ways of cause and effect in the universe) of regularities excludes the possibility for irregularities. Second, the mechanism for bringing God closer to the immanent realm *via* emergence does bring about a version of panentheism, but the cost is too high. The quasi-naturalistic approach in conjunction with what appears to be not a regularity but an irregularity - the emergent being God - are incompatible. However, there is a challenge for theistic dualism, namely, the attempt to bring God *closer* to the immanent realm.

The central objection to emergent-theism(s) goes something like this. First, the models of natural laws we are working with are predicable of repeatable events dependent on lawful regularities. Second, the sole origination of minds seems to be non-repeatable events and dependent on irregularities, even if the determinables (and general features of the mind) are dependent on regular lawful neurological events. Third, hence, the sole origination of minds is not dependent upon the models of natural laws under which we are presently working. What follows from the central objection to emergent-theism(s) is three-fold. First, naturalism lacks the resources to explain the origination of minds, and this seems to include quasi-naturalism. Second, the mechanism for bridging

theism with Science, namely emergence, fails to capture God's immanence. Third, consciousness, particularly Divine consciousness, remains at the centre of reality and maintains both the regularity of lawful events as well as possible irregularities.

2. Naturalistic emergent-theism (Samuel Alexander)

Samuel Alexander is a famous early emergentist theorist who attempts to bridge the religious world to the natural world in his positing that deity is an emergent product of the natural world. While not an infinite being, deity is a finite being at the head of evolution that exists within a natural frame. He explains his naturalist version of emergent-theism in the following: "For any level of existence, deity is the next higher empirical quality. It is therefore a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it. On each level a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the part of deity. For us who live upon the level of mind deity is, we can but say, deity. To creatures upon the level of life, deity is still the quality in front, but to us who come later this quality has been revealed as mind." [2]

Alexander describes deity as originating within the natural world. This emergent substance or property is mental in nature. As a mental thing, deity is an empirical reality higher than human minds, and this mind has the potential to continually evolve. Alexander likens his view to the British Idealist view from F.H. Bradley. On Bradley's view, God, which possesses deity, is an appearance of absolute reality. According to Alexander and Bradley, God is not identical to the immanent world, as with Spinoza's pantheist God, but a distinct finite part of it. Alexander confirms this, by saying: "Deity is located only in a portion of the infinite whole of Space-Time, and therefore God...is only in respect of his body coextensive with the absolute whole of Space-Time, while his deity is empirical and belongs only to a part of the Absolute." [2, p. 370]

It is important to note the distinction between other emergent minds and the emergent-divine mind. God is an appearance of the Absolute being, yet not identical to it. He is the product of the next stage in evolution after emergent-human minds. In keeping with the mind-body analogy, Alexander explains that God is related to the natural world as a mind is related to its body, yet the natural world is constantly growing and expanding. While possessed by God, deity is not the force that is driving evolutionary expansion, as it is not immanent to all parts of the body, but it does follow suit by adapting to that body. There are some initial challenges with Alexander's proposal that deserve stating here.

I agree with Clayton (as we shall see in a moment), there are several reasons why one should reject naturalism and naturalistic emergentism, e.g., Alexander's version of emergentist-theism. Part of Clayton's motivation for rejecting naturalism is four-fold. First, he is unconvinced that naturalism has the resources to account for the existence of things generally. Second, naturalism lacks the resources to account for moral inclinations, which are built into the human frame. Third, naturalism contradicts the fact of supernatural experiences.

Fourth, following Thomas Nagel [3-5], Clayton is convinced that naturalism is insufficient as a story to explain why it is that our minds fittingly match the rational structure of the world. More than this, there is at least one additional reason why one should reject Alexander's emergent-theism and all or most versions of emergent theisms because of the nature and unity of the mind. So, with these objections clearly in view, let us consider a more satisfying emergent-theism alternative.

3. Non-natural emergent-panentheism (Philip Clayton)

Philip Clayton famously advocates for a distinct variant of emergent-theism. Unconvinced by naturalistic emergent-theism, he remains influenced by a pseudo-naturalistic understanding of the world, and he advances a non-natural paradigm to account for the process of the Divine emerging from the complex of the natural world - hence a "bridge paradigm" [6]. Motivated, in part, by a rejection of metaphysical naturalism and the desire to bring God into the immanent processes of the natural world, Divine action has some role to play in the regular process of natural events. What Clayton rejects in natural paradigms is that there is simply a brute explanation for the emergent-God or that God would necessarily emerge merely from some suitably complex neural process.

In order to motivate his emergent-theist paradigm, Clayton draws from the mind-body analogy. Clayton believes that the mind is a property of the brain, hence he endorses non-reductive physicalism of minds. Accordingly, human persons are comprised of higher-level neurological properties that are non-reducible to the interaction of the lower-level parts and, mental causation is something more than bodily or physical causation.

For Clayton, God's origination in the world is similar to our origination in the world. God is the product of some functional configurative state in the universe. In agreement with Emily Thomas, the difference, of course, is that God is not the product of one local brain, but of the whole world [7]. And, his actions are more than natural actions, yet his actions are similar to human actions. Furthermore, God is related to the world from which he originates; similar to the way in which you and I originate from the bodies/brains of which we are related. I, as a mental subject (a), am related to this body (b) from which I came into existence. God, then, emerges from the natural world as more than the natural world, which is one important distinction between Clayton and Alexander concerning the mind-body analogy (i.e., the panentheist thesis).

An important difference between the natural paradigm and the non-natural paradigm is that God is not only the higher-order product of some complex material functional configuration, but he is also the source (contra Alexander's naturalist paradigm). God provides the ground in the world with mechanisms for emergence (for both human beings and the divine being). Clayton seems to reflect this notion of the Divine emerging, when he says: "How can God be source of all things and yet at the same time a thing or agent that arises in the course of the history of the Cosmos? It is this conundrum that has forced many

panentheists to accept a form of ultimate or theological dualism...God is, for us, the source and (we hope) ultimate culmination of this cosmos, the alpha and omega, the force or presence within which all is located...Emergentist panentheism thus represents a superior means for thinking God's relation to the world." [8]

In summation, God is the source of the natural world and the designer of the emergent mechanisms within it. God is also the final product of the natural world similar to the way in which we emerge as products of the brain. And, God is more than the world from which he emerges, and not contained by it—instead he is related to it as a mind to a body. Now, let us consider some concerns with Clayton's emergentism and emergentism generally.

4. Initial concerns with emergent-theism

Simply stated, emergent-theism presumes far more than it explains. The problem is the assumption of a quasi-naturalistic paradigm of the natural world. The paradigm makes regularity of objects incompatible with the emergence of minds, especially the Divine mind.

It seems that it would be an understatement to say that it is metaphysically confused to say that God is both the source of the emergent mechanisms and the product of those emergent mechanisms. Rather, given Clayton's commitment to a quasi-naturalism and his assumption of emergentism as a bridge to solve certain problems, it seems that his commitments yield a metaphysical problem. His commitment to emergentism serves the purpose of salvaging theism with a quasi-naturalism. However, these are an inconsistent pair. The strength of his emergent-theism is its ability to bring theism more clearly into the immanent process of the natural world, but as I will show later it seems we can advance a view of God in relation to the natural world that is able to satisfy all three desirables. More on this below.

There is a more serious challenge for Clayton's emergent-panentheism, and, for that matter, for all versions of emergent-theism. The challenge for all versions of non-reductive physicalism, i.e., emergent-physicalism (or emergent-monism), is that it would seem to lack the necessary and sufficient unity for consciousness, which is only magnified when you have a being whose consciousness extends beyond all other human minds. Our conscious states of awareness are not parcelled out between several physical parts only externally connected, but our conscious states of awareness are characteristically united as one single thing that has an inside perspective about a multiplicity of things and events in the world. Assuming God is like this, God would have a unity of consciousness like other minds. Both Alexander and Clayton describe God in a way that is parallel to human beings, yet on a larger scale of being, so the need for a unity of consciousness would apply to God. Rather than finding consciousness in the bits or in some holistic structural property, a thisness - a unity-to the mental items is necessary. Something like William Hasker's emergent dualism would be required if emergent theism is possible.

The notion that consciousness could not be found in the unity of bits of matter seems apparent at this point. It is clear on Clayton's model that he would agree, given his belief that God pre-exists the natural world. It is less clear on Alexander's model of what is meant by a mental and personal thing. According to Hasker, "it is not enough to say that there are emergent properties here; what is needed is an *emergent individual*, a new individual entity which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system" [9].

On Hasker's view a mind emerges from a suitably complex neural structure. This mind is non-reducible to the parts or the parts interacting. The mind is not a holistic property of the brain nor is it merely a higher-order property of the brain. Rather it is a novel substance with a mental thisness (i.e., haecceity) unique from the material from which it had arisen. William Hasker makes this argument in his recent article, "Is Materialism Equivalent to Dualism", where he responds to Timothy O'Connor's emergent-materialism, a similar, albeit more philosophically sophisticated version of Philip Clayton's emergentism [10]. Hasker's version of emergentism takes it that minds have thisness as a unity but it is not a feature of a metaphysically simple substance. In other words, it is not a sufficient kind of thisness that captures what it is to be a mind. Rather than having a metaphysically simple mental substance, Hasker's version of the mind is spatially extended, yet phenomenally united (i.e., subjectively) rather than objectively united.

If God is a mental being, in a similar way that you and I are mental beings, keeping with the human analogy from emergent-theism theories, then there is good reason to believe that God has not only a mental thisness in the sense espoused by Hasker, but a subjective or personal primitive thisness. Something more fundamental seems present to minds in the unity of phenomenal consciousness. A pure property (i.e., not a mixed substance, but properly speaking an immaterial substance that, strictly speaking, does not have material properties) of a mental thing that not only unifies the bits, but stands under the conscious bits as the agent. If I am an agent that has an underlying feature/property that makes me *me*, then I am more than a unity of phenomenal awareness. Based upon the evidence from self-presenting properties where I exist at every stage of the thoughts occurring in my mind and the existence of a fundamental fact that makes what it is like to be me something inaccessible from an outside perspective, I do appear to be an agent that has a feature/property (i.e., not a property as it is normally conceived as a universal, but rather a particular) that makes me *me*. I am a mind that is distinct from other minds, but not in virtue of the universals instantiated. I am a primitive thisness that accounts for the unified mental items in my field of awareness.

Given what we presume about God as a being that makes choices, it appears that God is like this as well. If, for example, as the Christian tradition (or the Jewish tradition, but the same argument could be applied to the God of Islam and possibly theistic Hinduism) has spoken about God: God speaks, He makes choices, He enters into covenantal relationship, then He too, bears some

properties that presume a mental thisness or something similar to it. In these ways, we reflect the powers and capacities that God must have in order to interact with the world. Furthermore, there must be something of what it is like to be God that is not directly accessible to other minds. As there is something it is like to me that other minds lack direct access, God must have an interior life that explains his ability to deliberate, to choose, and to bear relationships. One argument that seems to illuminate the fact that we are fundamentally distinct, *solo numero*, is that there is something of what it is like to be one mind compared to another mind. Take the fact that some minds experience the taste of Marmite (i.e., a salty blackish spread that usually goes on bread) differently. Some minds love the taste and others do not. There is no way to discern whether this mind tastes the same thing that the other mind tastes. It could be that they taste something different. Marmite-experience 1 is lovely. Marmite-experience 2 is repulsive. Alternatively, they could be tasting the Marmite in the same way, but one likes the taste and the other does not. There is no fact of the matter that we can discover that would resolve the difference in Marmite-experiences, which points to the fact that your mind, as a primitive particular, is fundamentally different and contributes something new to the world.

One could consider the example from recent scientific reports on the soapy taste of coriander as an instance of a scientific cause for a particular taste. The present report is based on several studies that have shown that there seems to be a genetic link to the dislike of coriander. The link to OR6A2 (i.e., is a particular gene protein in humans that encodes and triggers the sense receptor of smell) seems to be the link because of the sensitivity to aldehyde chemicals, as the report points out. However, it is important to note that these studies are dependent, in part, on the testimonial reports of individual persons in order to gather reliable data, hence the physical sciences provide us with a partial explanation. The report also points out that the genetic cause is only relevant to less than 10% of the cases. Furthermore, we could probably find several instances where individuals lack this gene and still have a negative experience with coriander [11].

On such a view it is not possible for a mind to exist as the self-same mind in another world. And, what distinguishes this mind from another mind is not the properties (i.e., universals), but the primitive thisness in question. For it is conceivable that say Philip Clayton could exist on Earth and another Philip Clayton with all the same empirically verified properties could exist on world Z (the denial of the indiscernibility of identicals). The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals could be false, and is only logically possibly true, but it is not a metaphysical necessary truth, say concerning physical particles, because in the case of physical particles there may be two identical particles non-individuated by their properties. For if quantum mechanics is true, particles exist as waves and lack a fixed relation to a particular spatial relation. Buttressing the truth that there is no fact of the matter regarding material things motivates the fact that minds are distinct from material things and retain some transparent character, which requires a primitive thisness. So, presumably, if it is

the case that God is a mind in some sense like you or I, then you and I have a primitive thisness, but there would be no plausible way of conceiving how it is that a primitive thisness could emerge given the views laid out above. In order to consider this proposal, we need to reflect on the models of natural laws between the physical bits and the emergent mind.

5. An objection to emergent-theism

The claim in what follows is not simply that the conjunction of natural law with the soul is an odd couple, but rather that the conjunction is inconsistent in some way or, more modestly, that the material lacks a sufficient causal explanation for the emergent mind. On all models of natural laws, a primitive mental thisness encounters significant problems.

Unique to all emergent theories of the mind is the existence of a lawful relationship between specified biological or physical conditions and the existence of the mind. Philip Clayton states this explicitly, when he says: “The crux of the argument lies in the notion of distinct ‘levels’ within the natural world, with each level being defined by the existence of distinct laws and by distinct types of causal activity at that level” [12]. As complex as those laws must be in order to map out all the possibly different qualitative experiences minds would come to experience, it would be small in comparison to all the biological/physical conditions that must be in place for the emergence of a Divine mind. Why one would ever postulate this seriously, apart from an unwarranted commitment to naturalism, is difficult to discern. For, the laws that would need to be satisfied would be excessive and deeply mysterious.

At this point, there are two lines of reasoning worth developing. I shall focus on one here and save the other for development elsewhere. The first problem is that the models of natural laws we have on offer lead to strange or problematic consequences (e.g., proliferation of the same soul, a contradiction, a reliance on a theory of laws not yet articulated) and, in the final analysis, seem inconsistent or incompatible, as I state above, with emergentist views of minds. Second, is the problem of the principal of sufficient reason for which there is no sufficient reason for the emergence of souls in light of the nature of natural laws. I will focus on the first.

The problem for emergent-theism, and emergent-minds generally, is particularly acute if we assume that material particles lack primitive thisness. In fact, most scientists and philosophers of Science assume that material particles do, in fact, lack this kind of thisness, and not just of the kind descriptive of minds, but thisness in general [13, 14]. So, if your intuitions are similar to mine, then you agree that mental emergence is a version of creation-ex-nihilo (and not of a Divine kind, but a material kind) and it does not seem that a fundamental something could come from what it is not. However, let us consider a couple of scenarios where we might conceive of minds emerging. These seem to encounter some serious obstacles bordering on, if not yielding inconsistency.

Let us consider something like Hume's deterministic universal regularities (or we could consider a relations-between universals view espoused by Tooley, Armstrong, and others) e.g., where every y is followed by event x, past, present, and future. Such a view is deterministic in nature, and disallows the possibility of an emergent mind because laws necessitate the emergence of universalizable events. For a primitive thisness of minds to emerge from a set of biological conditions, we would need a unique law for each particular emergent mind because each particular is fundamentally unique. In this case, we would have over 7 billion laws (and more to come) for the emergence of 7 billion minds. This is not to say that there could not be one law whose mechanism performs the same repeatable event, but that would leave open the possibility that two minds would simply be identical. Something is left unexplained, and without some additional explanation, deterministic laws could repeat the same event, and the same product. Not only is this exotic and, arguably unappealing, these laws would fail to reflect well-attested laws in the scientific literature, hence they require a model of laws that is inconsistent with the models of laws on offer. For that matter, it would appear that all these biological conditions would need to be in place and the 7+ billion unique laws for the emergent-Divine mind.

There is another more satisfying understanding of a lawful universe. If we consider an indeterminist universe, then laws are repeatable. For example, when you pour baking soda into water a reaction occurs that causes a bubbling effect. The combination of baking soda and water is lawfully repeatable. Another example, when an iron alloy is in the shape of a horseshoe with two poles a lawful emergence occurs that attracts iron. This too is a repeatable event. The problem is that if minds originate in lawful ways, then, in principle, one mind could come to exist again because of the repeatable nature of emergent laws (and this would not simply entail a duplicate because of the, presumably, lack of thisness for each individual particle). But, this would contradict the primitive nature of minds or it would require the adoption of some novel theory of natural laws not yet discovered [15].

What if we considered the possibility that physical particles are individuated by thisness, would this give us a way out of the problem? It seems that it would not. For the fundamental nature of each individual thisness of particles (of which we have no inside perspective) is absolutely distinct from each mind. There is not a plausible explanation for how this mind would come from these individually distinct particles interacting at some level of complexity. We could assume a hylomorphic view of particles and a hylomorphic view of minds such that minds are complexes of thisness's interacting that give rise to a complex thisness, but there are at least two problems with such a view. First, we would never have epistemic access to the thisness's in question, so it becomes empirically indistinguishable from the way we currently understand material particles and larger scale material objects. Second, most philosophers of science deny a hylomorphic view of reality. One reason they are skeptical of a hylomorphic view of reality is that there would appear to be a metaphysical constraint on the scientific process that would re-introduce skepticism regarding

lawful natural events. More importantly, it requires the rejection of a fundamental absolutist view of souls and, arguably, the adoption of a complex theory of personal identity, which seems implausible precisely for the reasons given above.

Even if we deny of minds primitive thisness, the Divinely emergent mind still encounters significant challenges that amount to inconsistency between natural laws and the emergent-deity. Consider the possibility that we reject that minds have a primitive thisness, would this change things? It might with respect to human minds or animal minds, but there remains a more serious problem with respect to God's mind. Assuming Clayton's emergent-theism, he claims that God is the ground for the existence of the natural world because for him naturalism lacks the explanatory resources to make sense of the natural world. He argues that God could emerge in some way, when he says: "there could be a conceptual progression from the sum total of naturally emergent phenomena to some sort of ground or source of all such phenomena" [12, p. 60]. According to Clayton's theory, God could emerge when the world somehow returns to its ground or source. This would be the highest level of emergence requiring the satisfaction of countless conditions in socio-biology. In other words, the complexity for meeting all the necessary conditions would increase significantly because the Divine mind depends on these lower level minds. However, this would only satisfy some of the necessary conditions, but it seems that if we assume that there is one Divine mind (which Clayton presumably assumes, but it is not clear with Alexander) the sufficient condition for the emergence of that mind depends upon one unique law being met, even if one rejected the notion of haecceity developed earlier. Practically speaking, there would simply be one Divine mind that, according to Clayton, furnishes the ground for material existence and is the originative cause of it. This means that the Divine mind is a particular, which requires the satisfaction of innumerable complex laws and one specified law. Furthermore, this unique law would need to be non-repeatable, but, again, this flies in the face of models of natural laws we are presently using. It seems not only odd and implausible, but unnecessary and inconsistent with the models of laws which are presently in use. In the end, it would seem to follow that minds would not emerge as lawful events. And, assuming we take Clayton's view to be one where God directly arbitrates the success of lawful events, particularly when it comes to minds, then it is hard to discern a significant difference between it and Cartesian Theism, or theistic dualism, as it pertains to the ontology of providence and God's immanence to it.

The desirables for a God world relation listed above are not satisfiable on emergent-theism(s), if emergent-theism depends on lawful regularities that become the proximate cause of the Divine mind. The mechanism for bringing God back into the quasi-naturalistic world actually precludes his emerging existence from it. In fact, for God, like other minds, to emerge would depend on a highly unique and specified law that fails to map on to the laws of nature for which we are presently working. In other words, it looks more like an irregularity rather than a regularity. Because of this, if we wish to provide an

account for the regularities in the natural world along with the possibility of irregularities, then we must look elsewhere. I suggest that we consider afresh the prospects of Cartesian theism, or theistic dualism, because it provides the resources to make sense of lawful regularities and potential irregularities in addition to the existence of minds. As I have already suggested previously, some form of dualism is already implicit in Clayton's understanding of the God-world relation, so it should not be a stretch to consider it afresh.

6. Cartesian theism (theistic dualism)

Cartesian theism is the view that God is a mind or has a mind. God lacks a body and is identical to his mind or has a mind. When referring to Cartesian theism, I am using the name in a rather elastic sense to describe a kind of global substantial dualism that clearly distinguishes God, as a mind, from the world of physical causes and effects. The clarity of distinguishing between minds and bodies naturally fits with a broad Cartesian view. Saying this, maybe it is better to refer to the view as theistic dualism so as to avoid the nasty implications often associated with Cartesianism.

If emergentism, on the whole, does not work as a bridge perspective, then we need to consider an alternative perspective. Reductivism will not work for the reason that various properties listed above cannot be accounted for by the natural realm. One alternative is a bridge-paradigm called panpsychism, which says that mental exist all the way down at a fundamental level. It too has its share of problems that are too great to embrace like the inscrutable nature of mind and matter. In this way, the prospects for a robust scientific research program seem impossible because what it is in nature that we seem to have access to may in fact be something that is altogether inaccessible from minds. For that reason, panpsychism is unlikely to provide fertile ground for a productive scientific program.

We may need to settle for the strong distinction between minds and physical things, given the worries with emergentism (which applies to reductivist materialism). Minds exist as fundamental parts of the world. If God and humans exist as pure minds, then something like Cartesian theism (or theistic dualism as some have called it) is true.

Cartesian theism grounds the nature of natural laws in God's choices. In this way, regularities are sensible and reliable because God has simply set up the world in this way. On this score, the first desirable is satisfied. Second, Cartesian theism gives a satisfying explanation to potential irregularities in the world, presuming there are such things. Why, in fact, should we rule them out automatically? We certainly seem to have one general instance of an irregularity - minds. Minds are not obviously products brought about through a regular naturally lawful process. As shown above, the models of natural laws we seem to work with are incompatible with bringing about minds - if in fact they are primitives. Theism provides an explanation. The difficulty is with the third desirable present in emergent-theistic accounts. The ability to account for God's

mind as somehow immanent to the natural world is oft presented as a challenge for theism. While I am not sure it is a problem, it is clearly a challenge, hence the desire to provide alternative theistic accounts in contemporary Theology.

There is this problem of bringing God more closely and intimately into the material world, which is the third desirable mentioned above. That said, it is so common that many have argued that Cartesianism encounters a problem. The problem, namely, of maintaining the close intimate relation between mind and brain. In classical philosophy of mind, Cartesian dualism is described as interactionist dualism. Interactionist dualism is the view that there is some relation R between mind M and body B . Common sense experiences presume that some relation exists because persons experience their bodies as their own. However, one common problem raised for interactionist dualism comes from the assumption that for the mind to move some part of the body, or some part of the material world, presumes that the mind exists at some spatial location along with other potential conditions: extension, and some sort of contact between minds and material parts [16]. Several responses in favour of Cartesianism are on offer. First, some have argued that there is simply a singular relation between minds and material things. There really is no further explanation that is needed. Some premise about the nature of minds is missing and needs establishing in order to demonstrate that minds must be spatially extended or have contact with material things. The argument, in other words, presumes what it cannot prove. A second response is more sympathetic to the claim that minds must be spatially extended to interact with the world. On this response, it is taken for granted that minds are spatially extended, but they are not spatial in the same way that material things are spatial. A third response is more promising. Following Plantinga, if one is a theist (and God is an immaterial being), then we already have a paradigm for immaterial things interacting with material things [17]. There is not a problem. Concerning the third desirable explicitly, Eric Olson is right to point out that substance dualism does not necessarily have a problem accounting for the intimacy of mind and brain, when he says: “the thing we call your body - may be as intimately connected with you as you like; but it is not a part of you” [18]. Similarly, God as an immaterial substance can be as close and intimate (i.e., immanent) to the material world as he likes.

Those who are sympathetic to the idea that theistic dualism has a line share of insuperable problems will undoubtedly opt out, which is a significant motivation to consider alternative monistic models of God. If one wishes to make this move, it does not follow that all is lost for Cartesian theism where God is identical to his own mind who has choices and preserves contingency of both the mental and physical realms. There may be one version of Cartesian theism that satisfies the desiderata of contemporary panentheism, but it requires the assumption of idealism and the rejection of substantial material world. Let me sketch one version of Cartesian panentheism as an alternative theism.

Sticking with the analogy of mind-body we can conceive of a version of Cartesian eschatological panentheism, but this will require a bit of stretching to some of the concepts. Taking a page from Jonathan Edwards’s idealist-

immaterialism, we might take it that God is a Cartesian mind that assumes the world or the saints in a similar way as a soul assuming a body *via* the eschatological work of Christ. This is not to say that God has a body in the way that process theists have suggested or in the same way that Clayton suggests. Rather, in the way that Berkeley understands bodies as ideas communicated to creaturely minds as the vehicle for phenomenal experiences, there is a sense in which the saints become ideas that God has or experiences as if parts of himself [19]. Edwards is an idealist in that the world is a set of ideas in the Divine mind that he communicates to created minds. I take it that Edwards understood created minds in a similar way as Berkeley. Created minds are substantial, yet also somehow Divine ideas. Substances for Edwards are stretched a bit beyond what Aristotle originally intended, but property-bearers nonetheless—what Mark Hamilton has called “relative realism” [20]. On this view, created minds (humans) are ideas God has, yet remain substances in an attenuated sense. These minds split off from Adam, i.e., they experience a “fission” process [21, 22]. They, or the elect of humanity, experience a “fusion” process *via* their union with Christ, where they become actual parts of Christ [20, p. 63-73]. Edwards describes this process in two places. In one, he states: “By that act of taking the human nature upon himself, he sufficiently in the sight of God and in the sight of angels assumed the elect part of mankind into an union with himself” [23]. In another more explicit place: “Christ loves the elect with so a great and strong a love, they are so near to him, that God looks upon them as it were as parts of him” [23, p. 404-405]. In this way, it is clear that the present model satisfies the desirable for God to be intimate and immanent to his creation, in this case particularly one portion of his creation.

On Edwards’s view, we have what we might think of as mind-idea panentheism [24]. Ideas for God are phenomenological products communicated. They are his ideas. When the elect become parts of Christ’s human nature (by fusion), they too participate in the Divine nature to such an extent that they become not only Divine ideas, but Divine ideas God has of himself [20, p. 64]. Keeping with traditional catholic Christianity, elect humans experience what some may call deification, which occurs at the eschatological consummation of Christ’s work in the created world. What we have then is an eschatological panentheism compatible with Cartesian theism.

Drawing from Edwards may provide us with a conception of God that satisfies the desiderata found in contemporary emergentist projects, specifically the three listed earlier. First, like contemporary emergentism, the world is unified in virtue of the Divine mind communicating. Hence the transcendent is more intimately and closely related to the physical world in a way that resembles this one aspect found in contemporary emergentism. This avoids some of the supposed nasty dualistic tendencies in traditional theisms. And, it avoids reducing the mind ontologically, yet it requires a revision to how we construe the physical world. Second, it brings Divine activity more intimately into the natural world. God is, then, not simply transcendent but immanent to the physical processes of the world by way of communicating his ideas to created

minds. Third, Edwards's doctrine of deification as the vehicle for panentheism paints a picture of the world as finding its culmination and perfection in God [25]. This, too, has some purchase with contemporary emergentists, like Philip Clayton. And, it avoids Philip Clayton's charge of division that he argues is found in substance dualism - even a view like William Hasker's emergent substance dualism.

7. Conclusion

If it turns out that an Edwards's inspired Cartesian eschatological panentheism does not work, then we have good ole Cartesian theism, or theistic dualism as some have called it, according to which, God is a Cartesian mind similar to you and me. If that is the case, what have we lost? Cartesian theism or theistic dualism says: "A comprehensive, theistic reading of nature will link all natural laws in terms of God's intentions". Furthermore: "Dualistic theism preserves the contingency of the mental and physical, and by placing consciousness at the very centre of reality it is unhampered by the problem of explaining the origin of consciousness" [26]. The unity of the world is found not in pseudo-naturalism but in Divinely intended action, and, arguably, that action is aimed at goodness if God is good. And, theism establishes the ground that preserves the unity of mind and body. Again, what do we have to lose with theistic dualism? It seems that we have much to gain by avoiding the inexplicable emergent-theisms, and, in some cases, contradictory notions of emergent-minds given universalizable laws.

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