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# THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THEISTIC SCIENCE

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## Abstract

Opponents of theistic science argue that science should inherently remain neutral towards facts, devoid of any theistic or atheistic assumptions. This article argues that specific areas of science, particularly within the social sciences, are inherently influenced by theistic or atheistic foundations, challenging the notion of complete neutrality. If a religious perspective is involved, this aspect of science may be classified as theistic science. Conversely, other areas of science do not inherently adopt theistic or non-theistic positions. Within this context, it is acknowledged that scientists may commit to methodological naturalism as a shared framework for achieving universal science. However, this commitment does not imply that knowledge obtained from religious scriptures for understanding facts cannot be considered scientific.

*Keywords*: Theistic Science, Pseudoscience, Empirical Science, Social Science, Methodological Naturalism

## 1. Introduction

Natural sciences are a branch of science that deals with the knowledge of the physical world. In contrast, social sciences study human society and social relationships. The term *social science* can be used in either a broad or a strict sense. In the broad sense, it includes the humanities, such as philosophy, literature, history, and linguistics. However, in its strict sense, it refers only to disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, economics, political science, and psychology. In this article, I use the term *social science* in this strict sense.

It is also important to clarify that although there is sometimes discussion about rational sciences—such as philosophy—and whether they can be classified as theistic or atheistic, that particular debate is complex and requires an independent exploration. Therefore, it will not be addressed in this article. The focus here is limited to examining whether the natural and social sciences, understood in the strict sense, can themselves be divided into theistic and atheistic categories.

The question raised, then, is whether science in its general sense—which includes both natural and social sciences—is neutral toward facts and free from any theistic or atheistic presuppositions, or whether it is shaped by such

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presuppositions and thus not neutral. In this respect, two main views have been proposed:

**A:** Some philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga, William Craig, J.P. Moreland, and Mehdi Golshani, argue that science can be categorized as either wholly or partially naturalistic or theistic. According to this perspective, a portion or the entirety of science can incorporate religious principles. This view is referred to as 'theistic science' or 'religious science'. Though theistic science has various interpretations, all point to examples in both natural and social sciences, providing numerous instances of the influence of naturalistic foundations on the development of scientific theories. They contend that it is naive to consider science as entirely value-free. Instead, they argue that some portion or the entirety of science is influenced by specific values and religious foundations. They further assert that contemporary science has been significantly shaped by naturalistic and atheistic perspectives [1–6].

**B:** On the contrary, opponents of theistic science, such as Michael Ruse, Mikael Stenmark, and Eugenie Scott, assert that science is neutral and impartial, not inherently naturalistic or theistic. According to the concept known as 'value-neutral science', science does not depend on any specific value, ideology, or religion. It is inaccurate to claim that science has a naturalistic or theistic foundation; rather, science is a method of discovering reality that is independent of any particular set of values. In accordance with this perspective, associating science with religion leads it to be categorized as pseudo-science. Science, by its nature, must be testable and accessible through experience and the senses. Anything lacking these characteristics does not qualify as science [7 – 10].

Mikael Stenmark, disagreeing with theistic science, acknowledges that certain scientific theories have been influenced by the foundations of atheism or naturalism. However, he argues that theories influenced by specific ideological foundations should be eliminated, and that science influenced by either naturalistic or religious foundations should be discarded [8].

In this article, I attempt to explain the views of the supporters and opponents of theistic science, elucidate the nature of theistic science from my perspective, and subsequently defend it.

As will be clear in this article, various explanations of theistic science have been presented, but my explanation of theistic science has the following differences from the existing ones:

**A.** Some contemporary philosophers, such as Roy Clouser, hold that neutrality is not possible in science and that all sciences have specific religious or naturalistic assumptions [11, 12]. I do not support such a broad view; I believe that only some portions of science have religious or naturalistic presuppositions. The larger parts of science have no relation to religion, although they may have other philosophical presuppositions.

**B.** The debates on theistic science raised by philosophers like William Craig and J.P. Moreland [3, 4] are mainly related to natural sciences. In my opinion, theistic science is mostly relevant to social sciences, because natural sciences typically do not have specific religious or non-religious presuppositions, whereas social sciences often have certain religious or anti-religious presuppositions.

**C.** Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga [1], William Craig, and J.P. Moreland [3, 4] attempt to deny methodological naturalism absolutely. However, in this article, I explain that while methodological naturalism is fundamentally impossible in some cases because scientists inevitably use specific religious or secular presumptions, it can be accepted as an agreement among scientists to reach a universal science. The main problem with methodological naturalism, in effect, arises when this view leads to epistemological naturalism.

## 2. The Concept of Theistic Science and Its Defending Arguments

In this section, I first point out the distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification' proposed by Hans Reichenbach. I explain that the opponents of theistic science argue that science in the context of justification is neither theistic nor atheistic [7 – 9]. In the following, while explaining and criticizing the arguments of the opponents of theistic science, I will point out the reasonable and justified meaning of theistic science.

Hans Reichenbach held that 'the context of discovery' is in the field of psychology, in the sense that various phycological or ideological motives may cause certain scientific research. However, 'the context of justification' is in the field of logic and epistemology, meaning that the justification of scientific theories must follow the empirical and rational method [13]. Based on the distinction he made, this question arises: although theistic motives can provide motivation for scientific research, should the justification of scientific theories be based only on sensory and empirical data? Or can theistic or atheistic foundations and presuppositions justify a scientific theory?

Alvin Plantinga, advocating theistic science, has presented numerous examples to show that in the history of science, atheistic and naturalistic theories have had a significant impact. This illustrates that science is influenced by these foundations. Theistic science aims to alter the trajectory of science towards a theistic orientation by replacing theistic principles with naturalistic ones [1].

Some examples of theories based on atheistic presuppositions are:

1. The research of the last century has proven the fine-tuning of the fundamental constants and forces of nature. Two explanations for this fine-tuning can be given:

   A: This fine-tuning was created by an intelligent designer.

   B: There are infinitely many universes, among which one of them randomly made this fine-tuning.

   In terms of sensory and physical data, both explanations are possible, but some scientists, like Peter Atkins, have chosen the second theory because of atheistic assumptions, while others, like Roger Trigg, have chosen the first theory because of theistic assumptions.
2. The defense of the steady-state theory or the oscillatory model of the universe by some physicists was due to their atheistic presuppositions; they believed this theory rejected the existence of God. On the other hand, some physicists defended the big bang theory due to theistic motives, thinking that it proves the existence of God.

3. Physics can never deny the existence of God as a metaphysical being. Additionally, physics cannot deny the existence of a purpose in the world. However, some physicists have claimed on naturalistic grounds that the physical evidence reject the existence of God or that the universe has no purpose. These conclusions are not derived from sensory data but are rooted in their atheistic presuppositions [5, 6].

Mikael Stenmark, an opponent of theistic science, does not accept the impact of naturalistic or theistic presuppositions in science and asserts that science must inherently remain neutral. He argues that science should be influenced solely by experimental and sensory data, and science stemming from theistic or naturalistic foundations is deemed inadequate. He argues that the aforementioned examples do not demonstrate that science relies on theistic or atheistic assumptions for its validation. Instead, the defenders of theistic science illustrate historical patterns wherein some scientists, rather than adhering strictly to the scientific method, have interjected their ideological and philosophical beliefs into scientific inquiry—an approach deemed erroneous. When confronted with such instances, the scientific framework built upon these principles should be discarded. It should be acknowledged that these theories do not constitute a component of the justified body of scientific theories. This is not to suggest that science is inherently dependent on theistic or naturalistic foundations. Genuine science is derived solely from empirical data and does not rely on any theistic or naturalistic underpinnings [7].

Stenmark argues that there are two possibilities concerning the viewpoint of the proponents, neither of which can substantiate their assertion:
**A:** The first possibility is that the defenders assert the impossibility of neutral science. Stenmark contends that this claim lacks evidence, as many scientific theories, in numerous instances, exhibit no connection to ideological foundations.
**B:** The second possibility is that the defenders suggest the difficulty of attaining impartial science, implying that historically, scientists have predominantly been influenced by either atheistic or theistic foundations.

Stenmark challenges this notion, asserting that the examples provided by the defenders are merely a few instances and do not adequately demonstrate that, in the majority of cases, atheistic or theistic foundations significantly impact scientific outcomes. Consequently, this possibility is deemed unacceptable [7].

I believe that while it cannot be asserted that science is always and absolutely shaped by theistic or atheistic presuppositions, at least a portion of science is not neutral and is inevitably influenced by these presuppositions. In the following, I will elaborate on this perspective. Simultaneously, I will clarify both my criticisms of the views held by the opponents of theistic science and the reasonable meaning of theistic science.

Scientific theories influenced by either atheistic or theistic presuppositions can be categorized into two groups:

In some instances, it can be argued that the incorporation of atheistic or theistic presuppositions lies fundamentally beyond the purview of natural science. The inclusion of such presuppositions in scientific matters can be viewed as a form of misplaced interference in natural science. This is because natural science is

restricted to commenting solely on the natural world, and the affirmation or negation of supernatural entities falls beyond the realm of natural science. Nevertheless, a scientist can express opinions on metaphysical beings, much like any other individual. However, it is imperative for the scientist to clarify that his stance is a philosophical viewpoint pertaining to metaphysical matters. This viewpoint is not grounded in sensory and empirical data derived from the natural sciences.

Concerning the third example mentioned above, it can be asserted that natural science, in itself, maintains neutrality toward the existence of God or the ultimate purpose of the world. Consequently, any commentary on the existence of God or the purpose of the world should be regarded as a philosophical matter unrelated to the field of natural sciences. It is not imperative for natural science to adopt an atheistic or theistic stance; instead, natural science merely presents the outcomes derived from sensory data. It is the role of philosophers to interpret these sensory data in either an atheistic or theistic manner.

But are all scientific theories alike?

In reality, there exists a second category of scientific issues that fall within the realm of science while simultaneously being influenced by religious or atheistic presuppositions. Take, for instance, the multiverse theory mentioned earlier; it appears to be a scientific theory, yet it is shaped by naturalistic presumptions. A scientist cannot assert that the multiverse theory is unrelated to scientific inquiry; it is undeniably a scientific theory. In this context, theistic and atheistic perspectives both hold merit. Theists and atheists alike have access to equivalent physical and cosmological data, both affirming the fine-tuning of the world. The crucial question is how to interpret this fine-tuning.

From a physical data standpoint, fine-tuning can be explained through either the multiverse theory or the existence of God. It could even be argued that the lack of scientific evidence for the multiverse theory strengthens the possibility of God's existence. However, atheists, guided by their atheistic presuppositions, put forth a theory that denies the existence of God. On the other hand, in theistic science, fine-tuning is interpreted in light of the existence of God.

Although these atheistic or theistic interpretations are inherently philosophical, they significantly impact the justification of scientific theories. In such cases, it is no longer accurate to claim that science is neutral, and the multiverse theory lies outside the scope of science. Instead, it should be acknowledged that this theory falls within the domain of science. However, as long as there is no scientific evidence, it cannot be classified as a theistic science.

In some cases, scientists can provide multiple explanations, each supported by equal evidence. In such instances, there arises a need for a criterion to prioritize one theory over another. Theistic beliefs can play a role in favoring a particular theory. Because the selection of these theories falls within the domain of science, it is inaccurate to assert that science remains neutral in these cases. Commentary on these matters is not beyond the purview of science; instead, these issues are within the scope of science, and various scientific theories can be proposed based on belief or disbelief in God.

Another example that can be considered is the theories proposed about the origin of religion. In these theories, various sociological, psychological, anthropological, and evolutionary perspectives have been suggested [14]. Are these theories justified?

If it is assumed that there is indeed no God, these theories can be considered justified because each theory attempts to establish the origin of belief in religion by using empirical evidence from different societies, the human psyche, or the course of human evolution. Without the existence of God, we should assess which theory is stronger and more justified based on the evidence provided by empirical science.

However, if it is accepted that there is a God, all these theories lose their validity because, with the existence of God, religions find their origin in God himself, and specific social or psychological conditions or needs do not cause the formation of religions.

Therefore, in this example, the theistic or atheistic view has an impact on justifying these scientific theories. Here, a scientist cannot be neutral. If he holds a theistic view, he does not consider the naturalistic theories of the origin of religion to be justified, and if he has an atheistic view, he considers the naturalistic theories of the origin of religion to be justified. In this example, the theistic view serves as the criterion for the justification or non-justification of scientific theories.

## 3. Theistic Social Science

The explanations presented thus far indicate that, in certain instances, philosophical and ideological foundations (whether religious or anti-religious) can play a significant role in justifying scientific theories. However, a crucial point to note is that this influence is more pronounced and prevalent in the realm of social sciences. This distinction arises because social science not only relies on sensory and experimental data but is also greatly shaped by its goals and foundational principles.

Take ‘economics’ as an example. According to the economic liberalism, the government should play a limited role in the economy, emphasizing the private property of individuals in wealth production, with a preference for the rights of individuals over those of the community. On the other hand, in the socialist economy, the government should assume the main role in economic issues to maintain social justice. Society’s interests take precedence, and the rights of the community are favored over those of individuals.

I do not intend to discuss here which economic model is closer to the goals of monotheistic religions. However, if it is suggested that one of these models or a combination of them is more compatible with the goals of monotheistic religions, or that principles such as social justice and the rejection of usury should be integrated into the economy, prioritizing them over wealth production, then naturally, this economic model can influence the entire field of economics and reshape many economic issues.

Or, as another example, in the law, the question arises: who has the right to legislate? If someone, guided by a theistic attitude, believes that the right to legislate primarily belongs to God and considers human legislation as valid only within the framework of divine orders, then many existing laws should be regulated differently.

Regarding political science, if it is asserted, based on the theistic attitude, that the government belongs to God by nature and the best model of government is one that considers divine laws alongside worldly considerations to ensure human happiness in the hereafter, many issues in political science will fundamentally change.

Regarding psychology, many psychologists today acknowledge that belief in the existence of God and the afterlife has very positive psychological effects on the human psyche. 'Theistic psychology' endeavors to address at least some psychological problems by relying on faith in the existence of God.

Many other examples can be presented in this regard, all of which clearly demonstrate that a religious foundation can transform a portion of science into theistic science. However, this effect is more pronounced and prevalent in social sciences.

## 4. Theistic Science, Pseudoscience and Methodological Naturalism

Methodological naturalism holds that the scientific enterprise should exclusively rely on sensory and experimental methods, and it is prohibited from incorporating religious assumptions into science [2, 4, 15]. Many natural scientists today are committed to methodological naturalism.

Michael Ruse, the philosopher of science, argues that the natural world, according to methodological naturalism, must be understood through unguided laws of nature, without intervention from outside. He holds that while methodological naturalism doesn't necessarily lead to metaphysical naturalism, which denies the existence of God, no scientist is permitted to introduce God into science [10].

The question that arises is: could theistic science be compatible, in any way, with methodological naturalism?

The answer to this question first depends on the definition of methodological naturalism and, secondly, on the definition of science.

From the preceding explanations, it is evident that certain aspects of science are inherently influenced by theistic or atheistic foundations. In these instances, methodological naturalism is not deemed acceptable, as certain segments of science do not maintain neutrality toward experimental data. Consequently, the interpretation of sensory data in these cases is shaped by either a theistic or atheistic perspective. However, what can be said about scientific theories that are inherently neutral—that is, not inherently derived from either atheistic or theistic foundations?

In such cases, methodological naturalism is acceptable solely because scientists in the natural sciences have collectively agreed, in the course of their

activities, to employ only sensory and experimental methods to develop a unified scientific approach. This perspective is further elucidated in what follows.

Natural sciences can assert that, based on a general agreement among scientists, they rely exclusively on sensory and empirical data in their scientific activities. However, they cannot make the claim that, because natural sciences are confined to empirical methods, the only means of gaining knowledge about facts is empirical. Similarly, empirical science cannot assert that, since it deals with tangible entities in the physical realm, intangible entities do not exist.

For instance, natural sciences can argue that there is scientific evidence supporting the evolution of the world's creatures over a long process. Yet, they cannot make metaphysical claims about the influence, or lack thereof, of God in the evolution process. God may indirectly preserve the process of evolution or directly intervene to create miracles within the process, producing beings outside the scope of evolution. Natural science can only report, based on sensory evidence, the sensory results achieved; it must remain silent about the influence of metaphysical factors—neither accepting nor rejecting them.

Another example pertains to psychology. A psychologist can assert the ability to analyze a person's psyche based on the brain and diagnose disorders based on brain activity, but he cannot make a metaphysical claim that essentially denies the existence of an immaterial soul.

Therefore, methodological naturalism is acceptable in the sense that natural sciences use only empirical and sensory methods in their activity processes based on an agreement among natural scientists. However, they cannot take any position to prove or deny knowledge obtained from other sources of knowledge.

It can be maintained that natural sciences, based on the agreement of natural scientists, use only sensory methods. Nevertheless, knowledge obtained from non-sensory and non-empirical sources is also 'science' and possesses its own epistemological value, as science is a method of acquiring knowledge about facts and cannot be limited to sensory methods.

In other words, methodological naturalism should not lead to epistemological naturalism. Epistemological naturalism posits that the only method for acquiring knowledge of reality is through sensory and empirical means. This assertion is not acceptable because science encompasses the understanding of reality, achievable through reason or revelation, in addition to sensory and experimental methods. A scientist in the natural sciences may assert that during empirical pursuits, he is confined to sensory methods and refrain from incorporating religious information. However, at the subsequent stage, he cannot dismiss the role of revelation in comprehending reality, nor should other sources of knowledge be excluded as the foundation of science.

In fact, the root of this debate lies in the criterion of demarcating science from pseudo-science. Various theories have been proposed regarding demarcation criteria. Some criteria, such as empirical verifiability [16], falsifiability [17], being puzzle-solving [18], and being more progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time [19], etc., have been considered to distinguish science from pseudoscience. However, it is clear that all these criteria focus on the characteristics of empirical sciences, assuming that only empirical sciences

qualify as true science. It can be argued that these criteria are designed to distinguish empirical sciences from non-empirical sciences rather than serving as criteria for differentiating science from non-science.

Therefore, methodological naturalism can be defined in two ways:

**A:** It may be asserted that, in the natural sciences, scientists have unanimously agreed to employ only sensory and empirical methods for specific purposes, aiming to establish a universal science and thereby prohibiting the use of non-empirical methods in these disciplines.

This interpretation is acceptable to some extent. From the preceding discussions, it became clear that certain domains of science are formed from specific theistic or atheistic foundations, inherently aligning with theistic or atheistic perspectives. However, regarding other realms of science that constitute the majority of natural sciences, it can be accepted that, as a convention, natural scientists have decided to exclusively employ sensory and empirical methods. This statement is acceptable within the context of a scientific agreement that may have certain benefits. As a scientific convention, it may be stated that natural sciences limit themselves to sensory and empirical methods, and the examination of the relationship between the results of religious sciences and religious theories should be explored in other disciplines such as philosophy or theology. Nevertheless, this does not imply that knowledge obtained through theological or philosophical methods is fundamentally non-scientific.

**B:** If it is claimed that knowledge acquired through non-sensory sources is not fundamentally scientific, this statement is entirely false, arbitrary, and lacking justification. Labelling knowledge not obtained through the senses as 'pseudo-science' stems from a positivist approach to science. This approach arbitrarily confines the sources of knowledge to empirical sensory methods.

Mikael Stenmark, refuting theistic science, asserts that historically, in some cases, atheistic motives may have caused some scientists to abandon the Big Bang theory and accept the steady-state theory instead. However, these cases represent a wrongful intervention of theistic or atheistic presuppositions in science. In fact, atheism or theism cannot provide a scientific justification for either the steady-state theory or the Big Bang theory. Similarly, concerning the theory of Darwinian evolution, someone may accept or reject the theory of evolution based on religious or atheistic presuppositions, or draw atheistic or religious conclusions from it. Nonetheless, natural science must maintain neutrality in these cases. Science should provide appropriate sensory evidence in favor of or against the theory of evolution, without seeking to link the theory of evolution to theism or atheism [8].

Stenmark's point of view faces several problems.

The first issue arises when it is claimed that theistic or atheistic presuppositions have no effect on scientific justification, as may be argued in examples such as the choice between the Big Bang theory and the steady-state theory. However, this generalization does not hold true in all instances. For instance, in explaining the fine-tuning of the universe, there is insufficient evidence in favor of the multiverse theory, and the most compelling explanation leans towards the existence of God. In this scenario, the scientist is inevitably compelled to explain the fine-tuning based on the existence of God from a

religious standpoint or to accept a seemingly scientific theory with the premise of denying God. In such cases, the distinction between theistic and atheistic science becomes meaningful.

The second problem is that, in the case of theories like Darwinian evolution, a scientist may exclusively examine this theory in terms of sensory evidence, detached from its religious or atheistic consequences. However, this matter represents a consensus among scientists rather than an inherent quality of the scientific process. To achieve a universal science that welcomes scientists of all religious beliefs, scientist may choose to approach science exclusively from a sensory perspective, avoiding religious or atheistic analyses. Nevertheless, if it can be substantiated with compelling reasons that God exists, the words of God in religious texts can also serve as a source of knowledge about the natural world. Even though, conventionally, we may not categorize this within the purview of natural sciences and may view this discussion as merely a philosophical or theological matter.

Various theories have been proposed regarding the relationship between the theory of evolution and theism, and many theists hold that the theory of evolution is compatible with theism. I don't seek to address the ways to reconcile the theory of evolution and theism here. Instead, what I emphasize is that if there are strong reasons for the existence of God, just as sensory evidence can lead to the knowledge of facts related to the natural world, God's words can also be a source of knowledge to understand nature.

The third point about theistic science is the distinction between natural and social sciences. Stenmark does not distinguish between them, while there is a significant difference between them, because many theories in social sciences are inherently shaped by specific religious or secular foundations. Examples illustrating this were presented in the previous discussion. For instance, in political science, if the premise is established that the right to politics and governance belongs to God from the outset, it results in a political science fundamentally different from one based on the notion of the dependence of rights and governance on the people. Therefore, methodological naturalism, as a conviction, is distinctive to empirical sciences, and a substantial portion of social sciences is not empirical.

## 5. Impartiality and Relativity in Theistic Science

The explanations provided in the previous discussions might lead to the perception that if we acknowledge two categories—namely theistic and atheistic science—the nature of science becomes relative. In this scenario, science may appear to be less focused on objective facts and more influenced by bias.

One of the key proponents of the relativistic view in science is Thomas Kuhn. In his renowned book, 'The Structure of Scientific Revolution', Kuhn argues that the acceptance of a scientific paradigm is primarily influenced by social, psychological, and ideological factors. Social standards evolve based on the cultural and historical origins of societies. While Kuhn maintains that his

theory does not necessarily lead to relativism, many of his statements in the book align with relativistic implications [18].

Using Kuhn's perspective, a model of theistic science can be presented in which the preference for a scientific paradigm is rooted in religious values. However, a pertinent question arises: Is theistic science, accompanied by the acceptance of relativism, superior to naturalistic science? Does embracing theistic science lead to relativism and impartiality?

Regarding relativism, I staunchly oppose epistemological relativism. However, I firmly believe that theistic science does not inevitably lead to relativism. If one defines theistic science in a manner suggesting that science is divorced from facts, relying instead on cultural, societal, or historical context, this would indeed lead to relativism. However, this is not the essence of theistic science.

Theistic science posits that sources of knowledge extend beyond sensory and empirical realms. Consequently, when faced with the need to choose between a theistic or atheistic perspective, alongside sensory and empirical data, one should assess which perspective aligns with truth and reality. If, through valid philosophical arguments, it is demonstrated that God exists and religious beliefs are true, theistic science naturally offers a more accurate understanding of reality compared to atheistic science.

Therefore, the conflict between theistic and atheistic science revolves around determining which perspective can guide us to discover the truth. In this context, I am not here advocating for belief in God or presenting arguments in its defense. Addressing this issue requires dedicated and in-depth articles. However, if it is established through robust philosophical evidence that God is real and religious values are objective, the religious science stemming from this foundation can lead us to an understanding of facts and realities. Reality is not contingent on cultures but on facts, and the validity of religious beliefs can serve as a novel source for uncovering these facts. Religious belief offers a fresh avenue for exploring reality, without necessarily leading to the relativization of science.

In the case of impartial science, it can be argued that theistic science is inherently impartial. As explained in this article, certain aspects of science may unavoidably carry specific theistic or atheistic assumptions. However, if compelling reasons substantiate the accuracy and truth of a set of assumptions, the science grounded in these assumptions remains impartial.

Bias enters into science when certain presuppositions are introduced without robust evidence. However, the mere presence of a presupposition doesn't negate impartiality. What's crucial is that these presuppositions are themselves proven through solid evidence. Therefore, if it is demonstrated that these presuppositions lead to a genuine understanding of reality, the science influenced by them remains impartial.

Almost no natural science theory is free of philosophical presuppositions. For example, accepting realism (instead of instrumentalism) is a philosophical premise that can be effective in the development and justification of scientific theories. Similarly, in some cases, theistic presuppositions can play a role in the

development and justification of scientific theories, but this does not imply relativism within science.

## 6. Conclusion

Wide parts of sciences, especially in natural sciences, remain neutral towards religious or ideological foundations and are not influenced by atheistic or religious assumptions. These sciences are not inherently atheistic or theistic. In this context, philosophical or theological interpretations of facts can be provided, and these forms of knowledge are a kind of science. However, according to the agreement among scientists, they are not considered part of social or natural sciences.

On the other hand, other expansive realms of sciences, particularly social sciences, are built upon specific religious or anti-religious assumptions. These sciences are inherently categorized into two types: theistic and atheistic sciences. Consequently, if the existence of God is proven as an objective fact based on solid evidence, then atheistic science should be replaced by theistic science. This theistic science is neither relative nor fanatical but is grounded in objective facts.

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